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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies are the primary interpreters of federal statutes1 and have taken on the task of “updating” the law
to reflect current conditions.2 Although scholars have advanced
numerous theories on how judges in the federal courts interpret
statutes, scant attention has been paid to how administrative
agencies construe the statutes they are charged by Congress to
interpret. Analysis of statutory interpretation beyond the realm
of the federal courts is long overdue,3 as Jerry Mashaw has observed.4 In recent years, scholars have conducted surveys concerning statutory interpretation among congressional staffers
and agency personnel to provide a glimpse into the black box.5
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 322–23 (2d ed. 2006) (“Most government-based statutory

interpretations are nowadays rendered by administrative agencies and departments, and courts are second-order interpreters . . . .”); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 892
(2007); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501,
502–03 (2005); Cass Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug: Administrative Agencies as
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1055 (1998); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response
to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 200, 204–05 (2007) (arguing
that agencies do not actually engage in statutory interpretation when they select among multiple interpretations of a statute; they are actually engaging in
policymaking).
2. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1053; Michael W. Spicer & Larry D. Terry,
Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: A Constitutional View on the “New
World Order” of Public Administration, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 38, 38 (1996).
3. For studies of statutory interpretation beyond the federal courts see
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE. L.J. 1750, 1755
(2010) (analyzing statutory interpretation in the state supreme courts); see also
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
180–200 (2009) (reviewing statutory interpretation in the federal courts).
4. Mashaw argued: “[s]urely, in a legal world where agencies are of necessity the primary official interpreters of federal statutes and where that role has
been judicially legitimated as presumptively controlling, attention to agencies’
interpretative methodology seems more than warranted.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L. REV. 497, 497, 499 (2005) [hereinafter Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms]; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 919 (2003) (“Precisely
because the empirical study of interpretation remains in an extremely primitive
state, there is every reason to think that much will be gained by further empirical efforts.”).
5. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside–An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and
the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman,
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Several scholars also offer theoretical explanations of how agencies should interpret statutes.6 Yet, we still know little about
how any one particular agency actually interprets its governing
statute in its adjudications. This is particularly concerning due
to Chevron’s7 validation of agency statutory interpretation as an
“autonomous enterprise,” with appellate courts charged with ensuring that the agency’s interpretation is a “reasonable” and defensible construction of the statute.8 But how do agencies arrive
at their interpretations of statutes, which are entitled to deference under Chevron? This issue is all the more relevant given
recent attempts by congressional Republicans to introduce legislation that would eliminate Chevron deference, requiring courts
to review agency statutory interpretations de novo.9
This Article reviews the statutory interpretation techniques
employed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in the
last twenty-four years through the presidencies of Bill Clinton,
George W. Bush (Bush II), and Barack Obama. Discussion centers around two empirical questions: First, to what extent do
Board members use statutory methods in a consistent or partisan fashion? Second, do majority and dissenting opinions “duel”
Part I] (reporting on a survey of 137 congressional staffers regarding statutory
interpretation issues and the legislative process); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside–An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 2, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part II] (continuation of Part I); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999
(2015) [hereinafter Walker, Inside Agency]; Christopher J. Walker, Legislating
in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (2017) [hereinafter Walker, Legislating]; see also Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 76,161 (Dec. 16, 2015)
(summarizing findings of the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) regarding assistance to Congress on legislative drafting).
6. See, e.g., Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (2016) (arguing that an agency has an obligation to
set forth the “best” interpretation of a statute); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in
the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871,
876 (2015); see also Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325, 325 (2016) (responding to Saiger
piece).
7. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (“[If ] the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
8. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 498.
9. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong.
§ 2 (2016) (amending the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to require courts
to review “de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions and rules”); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (same).
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with each other with respect to the statutory constructions they
apply? That is, do they use contrasting methods to interpret the
same statute, or do majority and dissenting opinions apply the
same method to different ends?10 After exploring these questions, the Article looks at the issue normatively by asking how
the Board—and administrative agencies generally—should interpret statutes.
This Article contributes to a real-world understanding of
agency statutory interpretation by applying empirical analysis
to demonstrate how one agency interprets its governing statute
in its adjudications. This analysis reveals that Board members
do not consistently use interpretive methods based on ideology.11
Majority and dissenting Board members bicker over the breath
of statutory terms, invoke different parts of the statute to advance an interpretation, dispute which statute should apply, and
disagree about statutory purpose. Both Democratic and Republican Board members are equally likely to apply both textualist
and purposivist methods in their analysis to advance a particular policy approach. The methods the Board uses have changed
over time, with the Obama Board relying more on broad pronouncements of policy goals to advance the Board’s statutory
mandate. The type of dueling between majority and dissenting
Board members has also shifted over time; whereas during the
Clinton administration, opposing sides argued over precedent
differences, in more recent opinions before the Obama Board,
members quarreled over whether text or policy should resolve
the interpretative dilemma at hand.
The results of this analysis underscore issues worthy of further exploration regarding agency statutory interpretation. Existing theories of statutory interpretation are overly simplistic
with a one size fits all methodological approach. In addition to
significant substantive differences between agencies, decision
makers must balance competing considerations of stability, coherence, and democratic accountability in infusing statutes with
meaning. Judicial methods of interpretation should not be
merely transposed onto the administrative context, as institu-

10. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 913 (2016).
11. See id. at 914 (finding that “none of the canons or tools seemed capable
of constraining the Justices’ tendency to vote consistently with their ideological
preferences”).
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tional differences between statutory deciders may influence interpretive methods.12 The decider’s place in the hierarchical
structure, its expertise, and its democratic pedigree can all impact interpretation.13
Far too often, the unique institutional features and challenges faced by administrative agencies are ignored. For a policymaking agency charged with implementing the President’s
agenda, one would expect to see agencies interpreting statutes
quite differently than courts.14 For instance, judges may cite
precedent to infuse statutory meaning in pursuit of the twin
aims of stability and coherence. But when agencies rely on precedent to the exclusion of other tools, agencies may abdicate their
responsibility to be democratically accountable by failing to fully
consider the practical consequences of their decisions. This result may be particularly troubling in the administrative context,
where adjudication concerns real-life decisions such as social security benefits, veterans’ claims, or patent rights.15 Moreover,
recent studies call into question some of the assumptions underlying textual canons—such as the whole text rule, whole act rule,
or the whole code rule.16 These canons are commonly employed
by courts in interpreting statutes, and are also frequency used
by the NLRB as this study reveals.17 But the fiction that when
12. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTHEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 213–14 (2006) (suggesting that
agencies’ expertise justifies wider interpretive methods than what may apply
for courts); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How
to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 434 (2012) (discussing the influence of the Supreme Court on statutory interpretation where
federal courts “uncritically” apply the same interpretative doctrines); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 420–27 (2013) (arguing that agencies’ institutional position justifies a purposive approach to statutory construction); Michael Herz,
Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 94–106 (2009) (same); Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms,
supra note 4, at 504 (same).
13. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 504.
14. Id. at 519.
15. Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 1165, 1165 (2016).
16. Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of
Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 179 (2016) (setting forth
ways in which Congress works differently than assumptions predict); see also
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 725 (finding congressional staff
were unfamiliar with canons or rejected their premise).
17. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 954.
TIONAL
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Congress writes statutes it speaks with a consistent and coherent voice—across and within discrete issue areas and across
agencies—may be especially inapposite in the agency context,
where a disjointed group of statutes, regulations, and caselaw
inform how statutes are implemented.18
These empirical findings contribute to the wider debate
about how agencies should construe statutes. Karl Llewellyn
challenged the view that textual canons lead decision makers to
arrive at a consistent, non-ideological, and “correct” reading of
the underlying statute.19 This study’s findings support that
claim. Board members continually switch their interpretive
method depending on outcome sought.
There are many ways in which agencies can improve their
interpretation of statutes. Agencies need to be more explicit in
describing how they incorporate policy and practical reasoning
in their statutory interpretation calculus.20 Agencies could
achieve this by embracing their role as experts, or by relying
more on social science data as the clear basis for agency decisions.21 The Board should more explicitly acknowledge itself as
a policymaking body, as opposed to a court, in order to preserve
institutional integrity and ensure the Board’s statutory interpretations best effectuate its statutory mandate.22 Moreover, agencies should leverage their expertise to make decisions in accord
with “background” principles” unique to the substantive area under the agency’s purview.23 The NLRB should also embrace rulemaking to make decisions on some of the matters it currently
leaves to case-by-case adjudication. Reliance on rulemaking to

18. Id.
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401–06 (1950). Llewellyn lists twenty-eight pairs of canons and countercanons (“thrusts” and “parries”). Id.
20. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions
for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2019–20 (2009) (suggesting that the court of
appeals and Supreme Court “review the action of all federal agencies to be more
coherent and consistent in how they draw the line between law, fact, and policy”).
21. Id. at 2019.
22. See Stack, supra note 6, at 887–900.
23. Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 136 (2009) (“[T]he most important consideration in an
agency’s interpretation of a statute may be neither the text of the statute, nor
the apparent intent or purpose behind it, but the background principles of the
area of law that the agency administers.”).
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advance statutory directives would be a better vehicle to balance
policy coherence, stability, and democratic accountability.24
In Part I, I survey the scholarly literature. I first review the
literature on statutory methodologies in Section I.A, and then in
Section I.B, I situate this study within the broader scholarship
concerning statutory methodologies applied specifically to the
administrative state. In Part II, I turn to the empirical study at
hand. I provide background on the NLRB in Section II.A and
then in Section II.B, I set forth the empirical methodology employed. In Section II.C, I present and analyze the data regarding
the statutory methods the Board used in its majority opinions
during the twenty-four year period under study. I provide summary statistics and I also set forth different typologies on how
the Board analyzed specific cases. I next turn in Section II.D to
an analysis of how the statutory methods used by dissenting
Board members differed from those used by the majority. I also
analyze the extent to which the majority and dissent “dueled”
with each other over statutory methods. Finally, I devote Part
III to discussing conclusions drawn from the analysis, before
making policy recommendations and proposals in Sections III.A
and III.B, respectively, to inform statutory decision making for
both the NLRB and administrative agencies generally. In so doing, I present a normative argument about the role that statutory methods should play in administrative decision making and
I advocate that the Board embrace its policymaking role by basing its decisions explicitly on expert evidence regarding the economic effects and ramifications of its decisions. I also argue that
the Board should reduce its reliance on court-centered modes of
statutory interpretation and that it should more affirmatively
embrace rulemaking as part of its policymaking mission.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATIVE METHODOLOGIES
A. BACKGROUND ON STATUTORY METHODS
Two competing theories have historically dominated the debate over how statutes should be interpreted: textualism and
purposivism. Textualism advocates interpreting statutes by
looking at the text’s literal meaning,25 while purposivism focuses
24. See infra Part III.B.3.
25. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 25–27 (1997). For more on textualism, see John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1648, 1648 (2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
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more on interpreting the statute by looking at the overall purpose of the statutory scheme.26
1. Textualism
Textualism calls for judges to look at the ordinary meaning
of statutory terms at the time of enactment, placing an emphasis
on predictability and constancy.27 A “pure textualist” would see
the statute as a “command[] from the sole politically legitimate
statutory law-creating body,” with the judge called “to apply that
command verbatim” such that “[i]nterpretation that goes beyond
statutory text operates in an extra-legal domain.”28 Textualists
are generally dismissive of legislative history,29 and argue that
general legislative purpose may be so “general and malleable” so
as to be effectively meaningless in informing statutory meaning.30
Textualists often rely on “textualist canons” to serve as
“rules of thumb” in how to interpret the text.31 The most common
textualist canon is the “plain meaning rule” whereby the reviewing body interprets the words according to their everyday meaning.32 Other textualist canons concern the rule against superfluities so that statutes are construed to avoid redundancy and to
give independent meaning to overlapping terms.33 There are also
a host of Latin-named textualist canons: ejusdem generis,34
VA. L. REV. 419, 423–24 (2005); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2001); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 452–53 (2005).
26. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27
(1994).
27. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 25, at 17 (explaining textualism); W. David
Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 413–15 (1992) (explaining textualism); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565,
1565 (1997) (explaining textualism).
28. Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 585, 595 (1996).
29. SCALIA, supra note 25, at 16–25.
30. ESKRIDGE, supra note 26, at 225–34.
31. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (2d ed. 2013) (noting how semantic
canons “are generalizations about how the English language is conventionally
used and understood, which judges may use to ‘decode’ statutory terms. The use
of semantic canons can therefore be understood simply as a form of textual analysis”).
32. Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1023 n.103.
33. Id. at 1023.
34. Id.
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which states that when there is a list of two or more specific descriptors followed by general descriptors, the general descriptors
must be restricted to the same class;35 expressio/inclusio unius
est exclusio, which states that items not on a list are impliedly
assumed to be excluded; in pari materi, which states similar
statutes enacted at different times of common subject matter
should be interpreted in a similar way as if they were one statute; and noscitur a sociis, which states that when a word is ambiguous, one should discern its meaning by looking at references
to the other terms in the list.36 Likewise, the whole act rule37
calls for reviewing courts to assume that differences in similar
or parallel statutory provisions are deliberate and to presume
that similar statutory provisions have consistent meaning
through the statute.38 The whole code rule looks at the way
courts in other cases have interpreted similar language in other
statutes.39 Another variation, the whole text rule, says the “text
must be construed as a whole.”40
2. Purposivism
In contrast to textualism, purposivism—also referred to as
dynamic interpretation41—contends that interpreters should
take public values into consideration and construe statutes dynamically to reflect current social, political, and legal contexts.42
Unlike textualists, purposivists argue that judges should discern
statutory meaning by first identifying the purpose of the statute
35. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 852–54 (4th ed. 2007).
36. See, e.g., Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1023.
37. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 862–65.
38. Id. It also includes the rule that both the title and preamble of a statute
can be relevant in determining statutory meaning. Id.
39. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides:
The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 871 (2012).
40. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012).
41. Id.; see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85–101 (2005) (advancing a purposive approach).
42. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 46 (1988) (“[S]tatutes ought to be responsive to today’s world.
They ought to be made to fit, as best they can, into the current legal landscape.”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical
and Critical Introduction, in THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW xci–xcii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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and then selecting the meaning that best effectuates the stated
(or implied) purpose.43 As Justice Stephen Breyer noted, “overemphasis on text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from
life—indeed, creating law that harms those whom Congress
meant to help.”44
Purposivism has its limitations. A statute may have multiple and cross-cutting purposes, making it difficult to discern a
clear statutory purpose.45 In addition, legislative history may not
always be a reliable guide to discerning statutory purpose.46
3. Substantive Canons
Substantive canons are judicially-created “rules of thumb”
based on overriding legal norms, policies, and conventions.47 All
told, there are more than 100 substantive canons.48 For instance,
the “rule of lenity” dictates that any ambiguity be resolved in
favor of the defendant.49 The oddly named “charming Betsy” doctrine states that national statutes be construed so as to not conflict with international law.50 Other canons suggest that statutes
be interpreted so as to not violate so-called “fundamental values,” or so as to not abrogate sovereign immunity, or not to
preempt state law.51 The constitutional avoidance states that a

43. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 42, at xcii.
44. BREYER, supra note 41, at 85.
45. See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2020 (noting multiple purposes of labor law).
46. ESKRIDGE, supra note 26, at 27 (“[I]dentifying the actual or even conventional purpose of a statute is just as difficult as identifying the actual or
conventional intent of the legislature, or perhaps even more so, since legislators
may have incentives to obscure the real purposes of the statute.”).
47. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 934–35 (examining the use of dueling canons of construction in Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions);
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1376 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting that substantive canons “promote objectives of the legal system which transcend the wishes of any particular session
of the legislature”); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 31, at 247 (“[S]ubstantive canons do not purport to be neutral formalizations of background understandings about the way people use and understand the English language.
Instead, these substantive canons ask interpreters to put a thumb on a scale in
favor of some value or policy that courts have identified as worthy of special
protection.”).
48. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 940.
49. Id. at 946.
50. Charming Betsy Canon Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://
definitions.uslegal.com/c/charming-betsy-canon (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
51. Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1005.

2266

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2255

statute should be read to avoid a “serious question” of constitutionality52 while the legislative acquiescence canons deems Congress to have agreed to an interpretation when Congress did not
modify it or not otherwise respond.53 Clear statement rules requires Congress to not interpret a statute in a given way unless
Congress made clear its intent for a given result.54
B. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The empirical-oriented scholarship analyzing statutory
methods falls into two camps.55 Traditionally, scholars focus
their empirical study on how the Supreme Court interprets statutes.56 Recently, scholars have shifted the focus beyond the Supreme Court to assess in a quantitative fashion how federal
courts and administrative agencies interpret statutes.57 Some
investigate how administrative agencies interpret statutes
through the use of surveys of congressional staff and administrators,58 while others embark on a more qualitative analysis of
agency-specific statutory interpretations, picking out a few examples of actual cases to illustrate given points.59 No study has
yet merged the various lines of inquiry to examine how administrative agencies use statutory methods in their day-to-day decision making in any sort of systematic way.

52. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 947–48.
53. Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade,
117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 91 (2018).
54. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 942–43.
55. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction
and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the
Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2010); Nicholas
S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1074–75 (1992).
56. See Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 934 (examining the use of dueling
canons of construction in Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions).
57. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I & Part II, supra note 5; Walker,
Inside Agency, supra note 5.
58. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I & Part II, supra note 5 (conducting surveys amongst congressional staffers); see also Walker, Inside Agency, supra note
5 (conducting surveys amongst agency staffers).
59. See, e.g., Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations
Act: The NLRB and Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 178,
178 (2009) (providing examples of how the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) interprets statutes and offering theories for how the Board should interpret statutes).
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1. Statutory Analysis of Supreme Court and Federal Court
Opinions
There are many excellent studies of statutory analysis of decisions at the Supreme Court and the federal courts. Much of this
analysis focuses on empirically examining how the Chevron doctrine works. William Eskridge and Lauren Bauer compiled a
comprehensive dataset of Supreme Court decisions involving a
statutory interpretation issue between the time Chevron was decided in 1984 and the end of 2005.60 They find no evidence to
indicate when the Court will invoke particular deference regimes
in whether to defer to the agency.61 In the wake of the Eskridge
and Bauer analysis, there have been many follow-up studies
studying how federal courts apply Chevron.62
In addition to the Chevron-inspired literature, another
strain of the literature looks at how federal judges use tools of
statutory construction, such as textual and substantive canons
and legislative history. Frank Cross conducted a study measuring judges’ use of tools of statutory construction to assess how
those sources constrain judges from reaching outcomes inapposite to what one would predict from looking at their political
60. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1083 (2008). The dataset consists of 1014
cases. Id. For other empirical studies, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy-An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Connor R. Raso & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010). For
studies at the court of appeals, see Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1443 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1 (1998); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot,
To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law,
1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (1990).
61. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 60, at 1091.
62. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 60, at 32 (finding that courts upheld regulations at a rate of 58% in the year after Chevron to 82% 2–4 years after Chevron
then back to 72%); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 60, at 849 (noting validation
rates); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 60 at 1039 (noting affirmance rate of 71%
in 1984, 81% in 1986, then 75% in 1988); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of
Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 436–37 (2007) (noting circuit court deference to
NLRB decisions regarding statements made by employees during union elections).
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background. Cross concludes that legislative history is more constraining than plain meaning.63 He also finds a marked increase
in the use of pragmatism by federal judges analyzing statutes in
the circuit courts.64 Cross also discovers a distinct increase in the
use of linguistic canons between 1990 and 2000, a period that
corresponds to a time when the use of legislative history was on
the decline.65
Other studies look specifically at interpretive canons, and in
particular, analyze rates of dueling canons in majority and dissenting opinions. One study of workplace cases, by James
Brudney and Corey Ditslear, looks at interpretive canons in
every Supreme Court decision in workplace matters from 1969–
2003.66 In the limited subject matter studied, they notably find
no relationship between ideology and the canons employed by a
justice, concluding that “in divided decisions, the Justices themselves are more prone to view the canons as reasonably amenable to supporting either side.”67 They discover that conservative
justices tend to use canons to reach conservative outcomes, while
liberal justices often use the same canon to reach a liberal result.68 In follow-up work, they narrow their claim, finding that
liberal justices are more likely to vote in favor of the employer
when using legislative history but that the use of canons and
legislative history by conservatives is more mixed.69
Another study by David Law and David Zaring analyzes the
use of legislative history in Supreme Court cases from 1953–
2006.70 Law and Zaring find that dissenting judges are more
likely to cite legislative history when a majority opinion also
cites legislative history, suggesting that judges are sensitive to
their colleagues’ arguments.71 Nina Mendolson undertakes an
63. CROSS, supra note 3, at 160–77.
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id. at 190.
66. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1 (showing little constraint by
linguistic and substantive canons); see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the
Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 117 (2008) (looking at constraining effects of legislative history on workplace cases); James J. Brudney &
Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231,
1231 (2009) (showing use of legislative history).
67. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Law & Zaring, supra note 55, at 1738.
71. Id.
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empirical study of statutory canons used by the Roberts Court
from October 2004 through October 2014.72 She finds that except
for recently appointed Justice Neil Gorsuch, all the Justices apply at least one canon in their authored statutory interpretation
cases.73 She also finds that the Court continually creates new
canons, that they are not applied in reliable fashion, and that
there is a “mismatch” between canons actually used by the Court
and those not accepted by congressional staff.74
Other scholars analyze statutory decisions in both majority
and dissenting opinions. Anita Krishnakumar did two empirical
analyses of Supreme Court statutory interpretation. In one article, she analyzes the role that “dueling canons” play in Supreme
Court decisions in the Roberts Court from 2005 through 2010.75
She finds that conservative justices use the canons to reach conservative outcomes in about 60% of cases, with liberal justices
using those same canons to reach liberal outcomes.76 She also
finds that the canons do not constrain the judges to vote against
their ideology and that practical reasoning led to greater rates of
dueling between the majority and the dissent than traditional
methods of construction.77 Krishnakumar also looks more thoroughly at the Roberts Court’s use of substantive canons, finding
that they are infrequently invoked as a justification in statutory
construction.78 Rather, she uncovers that Supreme Court precedent as well as reliance on practical considerations serve as the
“real gap-filling interpretive tools” that the Court relies on.79
More recently, Lawrence Solan explores the use of precedent
in guiding statutory decisions.80 Examining the use of precedent
in split five to three or five to four decisions before the Supreme
Court, Solan paints a “chaotic picture” of the use of precedent in
statutory interpretation.81 He concludes that judges on opposing

72. Mendelson, supra note 53, at 77 (stating that the Supreme Court frequently uses canons to interpret cases).
73. Id. at 71.
74. Id. at 78–79.
75. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 909.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 825, 825 (2017).
79. Id. at 887.
80. Solan, supra note 15, at 1172.
81. Id. at 1173.
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sides cite contrasting precedent, or strategically cite precedent
to advance their preferred outcome.82
Other scholars compare and contrast statutory methods vertically. Aaron-Allen Bruhl undertakes a comparative analysis
using a “matching corpus” method to compare and contrast the
statutory methodologies used by federal courts at three levels of
the judicial hierarchy: district court, circuit court, and the Supreme Court.83 He concludes that statutory methodologies differ
at each level of the judicial hierarchy, with some methods (such
as the federalism canon) being more frequently used at the Supreme Court while other tools (such as invoking the presumption
against jurisdiction) being more often employed by district
courts.84 Overall, district court, he notes, use “simpler” interpretive methods and take Chevron more seriously than the Supreme
Court.85 He concludes that lower courts use all tools of statutory
interpretation less often than the Supreme Court, other than
precedent.86
James Brudney and Lawrence Baum also employ a matching corpus method to compare the use of dictionaries and legislative history between the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court in three doctrinal areas: criminal law, business and commercial law, and labor and employment law.87 They find that
courts of appeals rely far less on legislative history and dictionaries than the Supreme Court does.88 Courts also use legislative
history in different ways, with circuit courts using it to resolve
ambiguities, confirm meaning, or reveal legislative intent, while
the Supreme Court relies on legislative history to shed light on
historical changes in the statutory text.89 Brudney and Baum

82. Id.
83. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the
Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court,
68 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2018) [hereinafter Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation]; see also
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React
When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100
MINN. L. REV. 481 (2015) (studying federal courts of appeals’ reactions).
84. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 83, at 3–4, 56.
85. Id. at 56
86. Id. at 60.
87. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation
in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 681 (2017).
88. Id. at 682.
89. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court relies more on “vertical” legislative
history (changes to the text over time) while appellate courts look more to committee reports. Id. at 688–89.
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surmise that these differences in approach are due to political
and institutional factors.90
Scholars have also begun to study statutory interpretation
focused exclusively on the lower federal courts. Abbe Gluck and
Judge Posner survey forty-two federal judges to get a sense of
the statutory methods they employ.91 Instead of finding that textualism or purposivism drives the debate, they describe the dominant mode as “intentional eclecticism,” with all judges employing both traditionally textualist and purposive methods.92 They
also find that age and past experience working on Capitol Hill
influence how judges approach interpreting statutes.93 Older
judges see themselves more as legal institutionalists, viewing
statutory interpretation in terms of delegation.94 Judges who
had experience working in the federal government, particularly
those who worked on Capitol Hill, are less likely to buy into some
of the interpretive canons concerning unwarranted fictions
about how Congress actually works in practice.95
2. Statutory Analysis of Administrative Law Decisions
a. Theoretical Accounts
Scholars have offered several recommendations for agency
statutory interpretation. Jerry Mashaw and Peter Strauss argue
that agencies should not necessarily be expected to construe statutes in the same way that courts do.96 Mashaw sets forth normative guidelines for how an agency should interpret a statute differently than a court as a result of its unique constitutional role
and practical necessity.97 He contends we might expect agencies
to “energize” a statutory program and engage in more activist

90. Id. at 687. The heightened exposure of the Supreme Court to media and
the wider political arena prompt them to rely more on dictionaries to “deflect
charges of judicial activism.” Id.
91. Abbe Gluck & Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1298, 1300 (2018).
92. Id. at 1302.
93. Id. at 1303.
94. Id. at 1303–04.
95. Id. at 1304.
96. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 519; Peter L.
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 321, 328–329 (1990).
97. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 501.
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policymaking in line with political principals.98 Mashaw also argues that unlike courts—who are more constrained by norms
like stare decisis and who seek to impose coherence on the legal
order—agencies need not always be consistent in how they interpret statutes.99 Instead, agencies should be cognizant of political
realities.100
Strauss also argues that “agencies essentially live the process of statutory interpretation,” and that the political nature of
the task of interpretation takes on a special role in the context
of agency statutory interpretation.101 Agencies, much more so
than courts, are able to use legislative history to greater effect.102
As Strauss notes, “[t]he enduring and multifaceted character of
the agency’s relationship with Congress contributes to the
agency’s capacity to distinguish reliably those considerations
that served to shape the legislation, the legislative history
wheat, from the more manipulative chaff.”103 Agencies’ special
“institutional memory” provides agencies with a unique perspective and a “critical resource[]” from which to discern congressional intent.104
More recently, Kevin Stack argues that agencies “are purposive by statutory design.”105 Stack suggests that agencies’ expertise, political accountability, and ability to effectively evaluate and vet proposals makes them uniquely capable of
interpreting statutes in a purposivist way by looking at the purpose of the regulatory scheme and selecting actions that best effectuate those purposes.106 He further contends that, because
agencies are guided by an “intelligible principle,” agencies have
a duty to (1) develop an understanding of that purpose; (2) evaluate alternatives for action in relation to the purpose; (3) act in
ways that best further that purpose; and (4) adopt only interpretations of statutes that effectuate that purpose.107
Aaron Saiger too argues that agencies interpreting regulations have an ethical obligation to espouse what the agency
98. Id. at 507.
99. Id. at 503–05.
100. Id.
101. Strauss, supra note 96, at 329.
102. Id. at 346–48.
103. Id. at 347.
104. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 508 (discussing
Strauss, supra note 96).
105. Stack, supra note 6, at 876.
106. Id. at 871.
107. Id. at 875–76.
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deems to be the “best” interpretation of the statute.108 He contends that it is wrong for agencies to advance a statutory interpretation that solely advances its policy preferences; rather it
must use “interpretive criteria” to arrive at the “best” interpretation of the statute, even if such interpretation departs from
those preferences.109 In particular, when a court defers to an
agency, it is incumbent on the agency to “say what the law is,” a
responsibility akin to that of a court.110
b. Empirical Studies of Administrative Statutory
Interpretation
In recent years, a few detailed and comprehensive empirical
studies have been done looking at how Congress and administrative agencies embark on statutory interpretation. Abbe Gluck
and Lisa Bressman conducted a comprehensive study of agency
interpretive practices by surveying members of Congress.111
They surveyed 137 congressional staffers with 171 questions to
inquire into what members of Congress involved in drafting
thought of agency practices.112 The study is one of the largest
empirical studies related to statutory interpretation, and the
only empirical analysis of congressional staffer opinions regarding legislative history, Chevron, Mead, Skidmore, and other core
elements of statutory interpretation.113 They find that legislative
drafters are unfamiliar with the names of certain doctrines, but
they still incorporate the assumptions of those doctrines in how
they draft legislation.114 The Gluck and Bressman survey finds
some canons to be out of favor; for instance, congressional respondents seemed to reject the rule against superfluities and the
whole code rule.115 Survey respondents said that legislative history is the most important interpretive tool after the text.116
108. Saiger, supra note 6, at 1232.
109. Id. (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 1234 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–
78 (1803)).
111. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 905–06. The Gluck and
Bressman study was preceded by a smaller study done by Victoria Nourse and
Jane Schacter. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
112. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 905–06.
113. Id. at 909 (noting that “there has been almost no other empirical research of this kind”); id. at 927–28 figs.1 & 2.
114. Id. at 907.
115. Id. at 933–37.
116. Id. at 907; see Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1040 (noting that,
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Two recent surveys have looked at the role agencies play in
legislative drafting. Christopher Walker, in conjunction with the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), conducted a comprehensive survey of agency rule drafters at seven
executive departments and two independent agencies to shed
light on the approaches that agency rule drafters use when they
interpret statutes and draft regulations.117 He finds that drafters believe the canons to be the “key indicia of interpreter fidelity” and that rule drafters are frequently familiar with the canons, even by the Latin names.118 His respondents note that they
frequently use canons such as noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis as well as the whole act rule, but that they do not often use
the whole code rule or in pari materia.119 Moreover, only a little
more than half of the respondents report that the assumptions
behind expressio unius and the rule against superfluities are often or always true.120 Walker reaches many of the same conclusions as Gluck and Bressman, though there are some differences.121 For instance, his survey finds legislative history to be
an important aid to interpretation, though, in contrast to the
congressional drafters in the Gluck and Bressman study, agency
decision makers are less likely to believe legislative history is
used to facilitate political deals.122 Walker also details how agencies provide “technical drafting assistance” to Congress, underscoring how agencies play an “active—. . .yet opaque” role in devising the governing statutory scheme.123
Like Walker, Jarrod Shobe debunks long-standing assumptions of legislative drafting, concluding that agencies often play
a large role a priori in legislative drafting.124 He surveys fiftyfour agency officials who reveal that agencies participate in the
drafting process such that Congress and the agency agree ex ante

in the Gluck and Bressman study, 93% of agency rule drafters said that legislative history helps explain the purpose of the statute).
117. Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1003–04.
118. Id. at 1004.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1028.
121. Gluck and Bressman, for instance, find less support for expressio unius,
and classified the rule against superfluities as a canon that was known but rejected, while Walker categorizes these canons as “concepts probably in use.” Id.;
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 932 fig.4, 932–36.
122. Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1041 fig.7.
123. Walker, Legislating, supra note 5, at 1377.
124. Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role
of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 451 (2017).
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on statutory meaning.125 Shobe also details how agencies work
collaboratively with Congress throughout the drafting process,
with agencies frequently offering extensive changes to legislative texts.126 The results of Shobe’s survey, much like Walker’s,
reveal a drafting process that is a lot more fragmented than commonly thought, with agencies being intimately involved in legislative drafting and often providing samples of statutory text to
overseeing congressional committees.127
II. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AT THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In this Part, I analyze how one specific agency—the NLRB—
interprets statutes over a twenty-four-year period. I first provide
background on the NLRB in Section II.A. Then, in Section II.B,
I set forth the methodology employed as well as how the data
was collected. In Section II.C, I present summary statistics on
my findings and I also offer a conceptual framework setting forth
what I see as separate typologies of how the NLRB interprets
statutes in its majority decisions. I turn in Section II.D to look
at how dissenters on the Board “duel” with the majority in how
they interpret statutes.
A. BACKGROUND ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), also known as the Wagner Act, to protect employees’
rights to organize and bargain collectively.128 Congress created
the NLRA in an attempt to (1) reduce strikes and industrial
strife which had burdened commerce, and (2) increase employee
bargaining power, which could have the effect of raising wages
at the height of the Great Depression.129 During the New Deal
era, the NLRB was one among many new administrative agencies created to handle the responsibilities of a burgeoning administrative state.130 Judicial decisions weakening union power had
125. Id. at 515.
126. Id. at 455.
127. Id. at 451, 465–66.
128. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69).
129. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151) (describing the purpose of the Act); see
also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 90
(1950) (noting the two-fold purpose “to voice an economic philosophy and to lay
a constitutional foundation for the Act”).
130. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies,
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caused many to be fearful of using courts as a vehicle to combat
labor abuses, so Congress created an administrative agency to
handle disputes as an alternative to courts.131 As such, Congress
deliberately designed the Board to both prosecute NLRB cases
as well as to supervise union elections.132 As reflected in the Act’s
legislative history, Senator Robert Wagner, architect of the
NLRA, intended the Board to be a non-partisan tribunal that
would make decisions detached from the whims of changing administrations.133 The new Board differed from its predecessor,
the National Labor Board, which was an arbitral body composed
of two members each from labor and industry, with a final seat
for a representative of the public interest.134 Appointments in
the first half-century reflected this spirit with many appointees
rising from academia or government.135 Despite efforts by the
Department of Labor to include the Board within its purview,
Congress created the Board as an independent agency so as to
provide some degree of insulation from political influence.136
Creators of the Board wanted a body that would be flexible
enough to respond to changing circumstances while at the same
1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 257 (noting that the NLRB was one of many administrative
agencies created during the New Deal era).
131. Michael J. Hayes, After ‘Hiding the Ball’ Is Over: How the NLRB Must
Change Its Approach to Decision-Making, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 523, 554 (2002) (“[I]n
passing the [NLRA], Congress continued the process of diminishing the role of
courts in the labor area by creating an alternative to the courts . . . .”); Ralph K.
Winters, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the
Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 59 n.5 (1968) (“The creation of the Board, therefore, may fairly be viewed as the result of congressional dissatisfaction with judicial lawmaking in the area of labor law.”).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).
133. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT OF 1935, at 1428 (1949) (noting Senator Robert Wagner stating “[f ] or years
lawyers and economists have pleaded for a dignified administrative tribunal,
detached from any particular administration that happens to be in power, and
entitled to deal quasi-judicially with issues with which the courts have neither
the time nor the special facilities to cope”).
134. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2000).
135. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 150 (1974) (noting that one of the NLRB’s first chairmen was a
professor of law with “little knowledge of either labor relations or labor law”);
JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD:
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937–1947, at 226 (1981) [hereinafter
GROSS, RESHAPING] (describing the appointment of an “economics professor and
former Resolution 44 NLRB member”).
136. See GROSS, RESHAPING, supra note 135, at 227 (describing the political
independence created in the NLRB by the Wagner Act in freeing it from federal
regulation and making it independent of the Department of Labor).
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time responsive to political overseers.137 The NLRA’s legislative
history indicates that Congress intended for Board member
terms to be short and for turnover to be rapid so as to ensure
responsiveness.138
After widespread labor strife and claims by opponents that
the NLRB ruled too much in a pro-labor fashion, Congress
amended the Wagner Act in 1947 through the Taft-Hartley
amendments with new provisions to combat union abuses,
among other changes.139 The NRLA has an inconsistent mandate
in that its statutory underpinnings represent an “odd marriage”
between the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act.140 The Act
itself is a reflection of different standards and operates somewhat at cross-purposes. As Catherine Fisk and Deborah Malamud question, “How radically pro-union was the Wagner Act,
and how radically anti-union was Taft-Hartley”?141 Some labor
scholars contend that the Wagner Act was a “transformative,
pro-union, pro-collective bargaining ‘super statute,’” while the
Taft Hartley Act was merely an amendment to reduce the power
of unions and NLRB abuses of power, but it did not fundamentally alter the liberal basis of the Wagner Act.”142 Other scholars
see Taft-Hartley as altering the pro-union bent of the Wagner
Act by significantly changing the power of the Board.143
In addition to expanding the reach of unfair labor charges to
include unions in addition to employers, the Taft-Hartley Act increased the size of the Board and created an Office of General
137. Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 167 (1985).
138. For instance, legislators thought that expanding the term to five years
would prevent Board members “from being subject to immediate political reactions at elections.” O’Gorman, supra note 59, at 189.
139. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–44).
140. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2036.
141. Id. at 2034.
142. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1227 (2001) (using the NLRB as an example of a super-statute); Fisk
& Malamud, supra note 20, at 2034.
143. Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 274 (1947) (arguing that Taft-Hartley “appears to reject
the policy of encouraging the spread of collective bargaining, [and] accepts the
institution where it already exists”); see Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1533–35 (2002) (noting that
the Taft-Hartley Act set back the labor movement and arguing that the TaftHartley amendments work “largely by addition, not subtractions; they left the
core provisions of the original New Deal text . . . essentially intact”); Fisk &
Malamud, supra note 20, at 2034.
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Counsel in order to separate adjudicative from prosecutorial
functions—a unique feature of the NLRB among federal agencies.144 The President appoints members for staggered five year
terms “with the advice and consent of the Senate.”145 Although
early Board members largely hailed from academia or the government, more recent appointees come from labor and management backgrounds.146
Unlike many other agencies, the NLRB proceeds primarily
through adjudication in its policymaking, only engaging in rulemaking in a few instances in its seventy-five year history.147 The
General Counsel brings unfair labor practice cases in a regionbased system, where they are heard before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ).148 The Board, sitting in randomly assigned
three-member panels, hears appeals of ALJ decisions if any
party files an “exception” to the ALJ opinion.149 Three-member
Board decisions are free from the constraints of stare decisis,150
although the full five-member Board can hear and decide cases

144. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–187). Unlike other agencies, the Board has an independent General Counsel, who is appointed by the President, and who is separate from the Board, with adjudicatory and prosecutor functions being divided.
Id.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012). The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 expanded the
Board from three to five members. Id.
146. Flynn, supra note 134, at 1364–65.
147. See Estreicher, supra note 137, at 174–75 (noting that the Board uses
adjudication to make policy as opposed to rulemaking); Joan Flynn, The Costs
and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 391 (1995) (finding that NLRB did only one
substantive rulemaking over sixty years). NLRB has faced criticism of its failure
to use rulemaking, with critics contending that an adjudicatory approach results in the Board frequently changing policies. Id. at 392.
148. Administrative Law Judge Decisions, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
cases-decisions/decisions/administrative-law-judge-decisions (last visited Mar.
25, 2019) (explaining “[a]n administrative law judge’s decision is not binding
legal precedent in other cases unless it has been adopted by the Board on review
of exceptions”).
149. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11–12 (2d ed. 2004) (noting
procedures). Less than 1% of administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decisions ever
reach the Board as most cases are resolved by a regional hearing officer on or
before they are heard by ALJs, who are bound by Board precedent in issuing
their decisions. Flynn, supra note 147, at 426 n.165.
150. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 149, at 11–12; Claire Tuck, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1137–38 n.162 (2005) (noting role of General
Counsel).
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en banc, which are then binding upon future NLRB adjudications.151 A party losing before the Board can seek relief in the
federal appellate courts, although the Board largely subscribes
to the doctrine of nonacquiescence whereby it rejects the precedential value of federal courts of appeals decisions in order to
ensure uniform application of law throughout the country.152
The Board’s orders are not self-enforcing; unless the parties voluntarily agree to abide by the Board’s orders, the General Counsel must go to federal court to seek enforcement.153 Only 1% of
cases are appealed.154
Unlike most other agencies, the NLRB primarily has only
one statute to interpret—the NLRA.155 Polarization and partisanship has inhibited substantial revisions to the NLRA, and as
a result the law has not been amended in any major way since
1974.156 Because of this, the NLRB does not have to engage in
much new statutory interpretation because it routinely reviews
the same statute in each adjudication. The NLRB hears two
main types of cases: (1) unfair labor practice allegations against
employers or unions,157 and (2) election representation cases or
bargaining unit determinations.158 The first type, unfair labor
practice disputes, are claims that some entity (usually an employer) has violated the unfair labor practice provisions of the
NLRA.159 Examples of unfair labor practice violations include

151. Winters, supra note 131, at 63.
152. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989); Flynn, supra note 147,
at 421 (noting that the General Counsel does not look to circuit precedent in
deciding whether or not to issue a complaint); Rebecca Hanner White, Time for
a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the “Law of the Circuit”
When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69
N.C. L. REV. 639, 639–40 (1991) (same).
153. Losing parties can seek judicial review of an adverse Board decision in
the federal court where they petition for relief or seek enforcement of a Board
order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(i)–(f ) (2012). The General Counsel can also seek enforcement of a Board order. Id. Parties can file appeals “wherein such person resides
or transacts business” or in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 160(f ).
154. Flynn, supra note 147, at 426 n.165.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (creating the NLRB to carry out the policies set forth in
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
156. Estlund, supra note 143, at 1530. The last major change was in 1959.
See Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–503).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
158. Id. § 159.
159. Id. § 160.
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discharging an employee for engaging in union activity, unilaterally altering the terms and conditions of a union contract, or
refusing to bargain with the union in “good faith.”160 Unfair labor
disputes are not limited to actions against employers (so-called
“CA” cases), although disputes against employers represent the
vast majority of cases heard by the Board.161 A party can also
bring a claim against a union for unfair labor practices (“CB,”
“CC,” “CD,” “CE,” or “CG” cases).162 In addition to unfair labor
practice disputes, the Board hears disputes related to union elections and representation petitions, such as cases about certifying
the appropriate bargaining unit or other aspects of the election
process.163
Board voting is highly ideological, with Republican members routinely voting in favor of management and Democratic
members voting in favor of labor in the majority of adjudications.164 Often, the Board reverses many of the decisions of the
prior administration when a new partisan majority takes gains
control of the Board.165 Critics of the Board commonly cite these
frequent flip-flops as cause for concern because they undermine
the stability of labor law.166 The ideological nature of appointments to the Board since the Reagan years has exacerbated this
instability.167 Former Board member William Gould argues that
160. Id. § 158(a)(1)–(5).
161. Amy Semet, Political Decision Making at the National Labor Relations
Board: An Empirical Examination of the Board’s Unfair Labor Practice Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223, 245 (2016).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
163. Id. § 159(i).
164. See, e.g., William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi III, Political Bias
in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539, 549
(1982) (finding that the presidential appointment process has a major impact
on the Board’s voting patterns); Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2020 (noting
that “[a]cross a range of doctrinal arenas, it is apparent that Bush II labor policy
made a decisive shift in favor of protecting managerial prerogative and augmenting the ability of employers and employees to oppose unionization”); Flynn,
supra note 134, at 1411 (noting the partisan-based voting patterns); Ronald
Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. LAB.
& EMP. L. 707, 712 (2006) (noting the predictive value of ideology in votes at the
Board).
165. Tuck, supra note 150, at 1153 (noting how after there is a change in
presidential administration, resulting in new Board members, the Board often
reverses many of the precedents made by the prior Board).
166. Cooke & Gautschi, supra note 164, at 549 (noting how the inconsistency
and ambiguity that plagues Board’s decisions can hinder labor management relations).
167. Flynn, supra note 134, at 1366. Changes in the appointment process
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the nomination process, characterized by “batching” nominees
together for congressional approval, has exacerbated the partisanship at the Board.168 Today, there is an informal tradition of
appointing both Democrats and Republicans to the Board, while
ensuring that the President’s party maintains a three to two majority and that a member from the President’s party chairs the
Board.169 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Board consisted of two ex-management lawyers, two former union lawyers,
a former law professor, and a career Board employee—exactly
the type of Board Congress expressly rejected when designing
the NLRB.170
B. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYZING NLRB STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
To analyze how the Board interprets statutes, I first created
a dataset consisting of the cases in which the Board engages in
statutory interpretation of the NLRA. The Board, in some respects, engages in statutory interpretation every time it adjudicates a case; it must decide whether any given fact scenario fits
within the violations set forth by the NLRA. Most of these cases,
however, fit into predictable fact patterns that the Board can
easily resolve by applying precedent. As such, I limit the analysis
to only those few cases in which the Board can fairly be said to

over the years—including the rise of “packaged” appointments where groups of
nominees for different governmental posts are “packaged” together for a Senate
vote—exacerbated the trend of a more partisan nomination process. Id. at 1367.
Indeed, with one exception, all of President Clinton’s appointees have been
packaged nominations. Administration Faces Possibility of Four Vacancies, No
Quorum, at NLRB, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-8 (Oct. 20, 1997)
(noting that Clinton had to make recess appointments to keep the agency up
and running).
168. William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Relations Board’s Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501,
1526 (2015); see Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1762, 1762 n.112 (2015) (noting how insiders composed
many of the appointments).
169. See Estreicher, supra note 137, at 170 (noting how the Board’s lawmaking is often seen as “unstable”); Tuck, supra note 150, at 1118 (arguing that
the Board’s flip-flops “undermine[ ] the stability, certainty and efficiency
of . . . policies . . . because neither party can rely on Board precedent”); Turner,
supra note 164, at 714 (“As a matter of custom, and not law, no more than three
of the five NLRB members may belong to the President’s political party.”).
170. Turner, supra note 164, at 764 (listing experience of Board members in
the Appendix).
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engage in statutory interpretation as a matter of first impression, as opposed to simply applying an established rule to new
factual circumstances.
This dataset includes NLRB cases through the Clinton,
Bush II, and Obama Administrations. The dataset includes
NLRB cases decided between 1993 through the end of the
Obama administration in January 2017. In all, I reviewed more
than 7000 cases to discern cases involving statutory interpretation.171 When reading each case, I coded the statutory methodology employed. I also performed a word search to capture all cases
in which the Board engaged in statutory interpretation, and I
similarly looked at all NLRB appellate cases that discussed either Chevron or statutory interpretation.172
I find that the Board engages in some measure of statutory
interpretation in less than 2% of all cases during the indicated
time frame; in most instances, it simply applies existing caselaw.
This finding is unsurprising. As Fish and Malamud note, a large
proportion of the Board’s decisions do not rely on any specific
statutory language, a result of the lack of any recent legislative
activity.173 Moreover, there is no “helpful” legislative history as
the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation in NLRB cases “often turns on nothing more than statements about the underlying
purposes of the statute, and shows the same incapacity the
Board manifests when it comes to how to prioritize Wagner Act
versus Taft-Hartley formulation of those purposes.”174
The results may be underinclusive in some respects. I only
include cases in which the Board, acting as a three or five-member entity, itself actually engaged in statutory interpretation.175
171. See Semet, supra note 161. In the prior analysis, I only looked at unfair
labor practice cases. Id.
172. These words include “statutory construction,” “statutory interpretation,” “plain meaning,” “dictionary,” “statutory canons,” “redundancy,” “exclusion,” “clear statement,” “canons of construction,” searches for the Latin canons,
and the names of other substantive and textual cases as well as searches for
“ambiguous,” or “text” within the same sentence as “statute” or “statutory.” I
also did searches under “concerted action” and various iterations of the word
“violations” or “violate,” and “statute.” I separately did a search in the federal
courts of appeals to see cases where courts applied Chevron or other deference
regimes to see if I could pick up additional cases. As part of another project, I
coded over 1400 appellate court decisions referencing the NLRB from 1993
through early 2017, and I referred to that dataset as an additional check. See
Amy Semet, Predicting Deference in NLRB Appellate Court Cases (Working Paper 2019) (on file with author).
173. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2039.
174. Id. at 2039–40.
175. I exclude cases where the majority applied well-settled precedent but
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There are several cases in which the Board merely blesses the
opinion of the ALJ by issuing a short order upholding the opinion.176 The ALJ may have set forth a statutory interpretation,
but because there is no Board opinion, it is impossible to know
whether the Board simply affirms the ALJ because it agrees with
the result or because it in fact favors the statutory methodologies
employed by the ALJ.177 Indeed, in some cases, the Board even
notes in a footnote that while it upholds the decision, it does not
necessarily agree with the ALJ’s approach.178
I also do not include cases in which the Board “implicitly”
interprets the statute unless it is clear that the Board is setting
forth a new rule to apply to future adjudications. For instance,
the Board has a well-developed precedent to guide the determination of whether an employee was unlawfully terminated—the
so-called Wright Line179 analysis whereby the Board analyzes a
three-factor test of employer conduct and motivation to discern
whether the conduct was unlawful. The Board hears hundreds
of Wright Line cases where the Board applies precedent to determine whether a violation occurred.180 Similarly, in hundreds of
cases, the Board reviews whether or not someone is an “employee” under the Act’s provisions.181 In the dataset, I would
have included a case like Wright Line, in which the Board devises a test as a matter of first impression, but I do not include
the hundreds of cases applying the Wright Line test to various
facts to discern whether someone is an “employee.” In those
cases, there is no dispute concerning the applicable law; rather,
the inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a

the dissent advocated an overturning of that precedent. See, e.g., Bristol Farms
& Konny Renteria, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 45, at *3 (Nov. 25, 2015) (dissent disagreeing with Board precedent). I also did not double count cases issued the same day
where the Board made identical statutory interpretation issues. See, e.g., Yukon
Kuskokwim Health Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Oct. 29, 1999) (making a similar
statutory interpretation as another case issued the same day discussing jurisdiction under NLRA).
176. See, e.g., Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 322 N.L.R.B. 175 (1996)
(blessing ALJ opinion in short summary opinion).
177. See, e.g., Mail Contractors of Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(statutory interpretation done by ALJ).
178. See, e.g., Law-Den Nursing Home, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 119 (2014).
179. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
180. See, e.g., Atlanta Motor Lines, 308 N.L.R.B. 909 (1992).
181. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *1 (Aug. 23, 2016); N.Y. Univ.,
332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1209 (2006); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004).
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violation. I also do not include cases in which the NLRB interprets a statute other than the NLRA,182 or in which the Board
rules on internal administrative matters, which often arise in
cases concerning union elections.183 Further, I do not include
cases in which the statutory issue is fact-specific; for example,
the Board may rule on whether conduct is “concerted activity.”184
Such an inquiry, however, is necessarily bound up in the specific
fact situation of any one case, making it impossible to come up
with a general rule to apply in future cases.
Some cases lack a clear interpretive strategy. The Board
sets forth a fact scenario and makes a determination but does
not specify its reasoning except to rely on caselaw. To the extent
that these “caselaw only” decisions represent implicit policy determinations, the dataset would necessarily underestimate the
extent to which the Board uses pure policymaking to guide statutory interpretations. However, there are several reasons for excluding such cases. None of these cases involve any discussion of
the text of the NLRA, or its legislative history, or policy, or practical considerations, and the Board is not announcing that it is
devising a new rule. Moreover, unlike the vast majority of the
cases included in the dataset, hardly any of these cases have a
dissent or concurrence. Given the frequency of Board dissents,
this lack of dissenting opinions is likely an indication that the
excluded cases involve easy to analyze factual situations clearly
fitting within established precedent. Finally, these cases are decided by three-judge panels. Although not a strict rule (there are
three-judge panel decisions included in the dataset), precedential cases are decided by the full Board. In any event, to the extent this study is underinclusive, it may exclude some cases
where the NLRB’s sole interpretive method is to piece together
some sort of statutory interpretation from its own or Supreme
182. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 741, 321 N.L.R.B. 886 (1996) (interpreting the Equal Access to Justice Act); see also Times Herald Printing Co.,
315 N.L.R.B. 700 (1994) (interpreting the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988).
183. For instance, in Firstline Transp. Sec., Inc., the Board defers to another
administrative agency in how to interpret the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. 347 N.L.R.B. 447 (2006). I also do not include cases where the Board
rules on its own procedures or processes or interprets its own regulations regarding the conduct of internal adjudicative matters. For instance, I do not include cases where the Board interprets the format of briefs or how a subpoena
should issue, among other issues. See, e.g., Best W. City View Motor Inn, 327
N.L.R.B. 468 (1999).
184. See, e.g., Aroostook Cty. Reg’l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218
(1995).
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Court caselaw laced together with a policy prescription.185 As an
additional robustness check, in the course of reviewing both
Board and appellate court decisions reviewing NLRB cases,186 I
became familiar with all NLRB cases that were cited as precedent in other NLRB or appellate court decisions. Although the
data is censored (meaning recent Board decisions made in 2015
or 2016 may not yet appear as precedent), I included any precedent-only cases cited repeatedly for new points of law or application of precedent to establish a new rule in a different factual
situation.187
The analysis rests on the assumption that the Board is
transparent and that the opinions actually reflect the statutory
methodology used by the Board. But as the Gluck and Posner
survey found, what judges write in their opinions is not necessarily correlative with the statutory methods judges actually use

185. The Board occasionally cites circuit court cases, but its use is usually
supplementary to Board or Supreme Court decisions. This is not all together
surprising given that the Board engages in a policy of nonacquiescence of appellate court decisions. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 152, at 681. My
data reveals that this policy is not merely theoretical; my own observation after
reading over 7000 NLRB cases is that the Board rarely will voice concern that
its ruling will conflict with a precedent set by whatever regional court will likely
review the case. That said, I include some cases remanded from the court of
appeals. Sometimes, the court of appeals remands for the Board to either (1)
adopt the statutory interpretation of the court of appeals; or (2) to make clear
what the Board’s statutory interpretation actually was. I do not, however, double count cases. In the few situations where the Board hears a case multiple
times, I include the case in which the Board interprets the statute and in one
instance, I included the same case before and after remand since the interpretations differ. See, e.g., Randell Warehouse of A.Z., Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 591 (2006);
Randell Warehouse of A.Z., Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1999). I exclude cases in
which the Board simply adopts the “law of the case” from the appellate court.
See, e.g., Goodless Elec. Co., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1037 (2000).
186. In another paper, I analyze and compare the statutory methods used by
the appellate courts versus the Board. See Amy Semet, Empirically Examining
Chevron Deference and NLRB Statutory Interpretation in the Appellate Courts
(Working Paper 2019) (on file with author). I trace the cases cited in this dataset
to see which methods the appellate court uses. Id. I also add additional cases
where the appellate court invokes Chevron or otherwise engages in statutory
interpretation. Id.
187. A small number of cases had more than one statutory interpretation.
However, in all cases one interpretation was best resolved as a matter of first
impression by another case so only that case was included. See, e.g., AnheuserBusch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 644, 646 (2007) (NLRB case after remand used to analyze statutory interpretation on second issue on remedy); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560 (2004) (statutory interpretation issue on unfair labor
practice claim best resolved by Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515, 515–
516 (1997)).
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to decide cases.188 To some extent, use of a particular statutory
method in a decision could be merely window-dressing.189 There
is no way to know whether the opinion accurately or completely
reflects the Board’s interpretive process. The same concern, however, can be said of any empirical analysis of statutory interpretation, or analysis of judicial voting generally.190 Selection effects
could also be at work; only a small number of ALJ cases are appealed to the NLRB.191 Recognizing these limitations, the purpose of the study is not to draw predictive inferences but to show,
in a descriptive fashion, how an agency interprets its governing
statute.
Having set forth the limitations of this study, I next analyze
the different interpretive methodologies employed by the Board.
In preparing the dataset, I coded for the following statutory
tools: the plain meaning rule; the Latin/language canons; substantive canons; legislative history (as well as source of legislative history); use of precedent; mentions of policy; and references
to practical implications. These interpretive tools are similar to
those studied in other empirical studies of statutory interpretation.192
In coding policy, I look to statements about how the Board
balanced competing policy needs or whether a given statutory
interpretation would effectuate the stated goal of the NLRA to
reduce inequality in bargaining or to inhibit strikes. Some cases
could be coded as either precedent or policy. Cases are coded as
policy if the Board adopts a new rule, even if that rule might
simply be a return to a prior Board precedent since that involves
a policy choice to abandon existing precedent. Practical consequences concern such things as the workability of the proposed
ruling, the effect such a ruling would have on labor relations, the
burdens imposed on the worker or the employer under the proposed ruling, or the overall effects that may occur in labor law

188. Gluck & Posner, supra note 91, at 1330.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1315 (“We can acknowledge that judges use a mixture of interpretive tools and . . . many judges do not seem to have a consistent or identifiable
interpretative approach.”).
191. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (describing the influences of
private decisions that lead to or prevent cases from being litigated).
192. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 3, at 148 (analyzing the Roberts’ Court use
of statutory interpretive tools); Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 922 (listing the
interpretive tools within the empirical study).
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generally should the Board’s rule stand.193 As in other empirical
studies, I include the absurdity canon under policy or practical
consequences.194
I code an interpretive canon if the Board relies on it; if the
opinion only mentions a canon in passing or if it rejects a particular tool as unpersuasive, I code for it separately, signifying that
it was in response to a majority or dissenting opinion.195 Likewise, if the decision rank-ordered interpretive tools, I make note
of it. In my analysis, I also code for the use of “dueling” canons
by which the majority and dissent both employ the same interpretive canon to advance their viewpoint.196 Board members may
“duel” with each other in a textual matter by (1) focusing on different words or seeing different relationships between parts of
the statute; (2) differing in how narrow or broad they interpret
the very same words; or (3) focusing on the same word but ascribing a different meaning to the text.197 Purposivists can also
“duel” with each other by (1) focusing on different, competing
purposes; (2) focusing on the same purpose but drawing different
conclusions about that purpose; or (3) focusing on a broad, general statutory purpose while another decision maker focuses on
narrowly drawn specific purposes.198
If a case has multiple dissents, I combine the dissents into
one for purposes of this analysis so there are no mixed partisan
dissents. That is, there are only a handful of cases in which both
a Democrat and Republican Board member both dissent on a
statutory interpretation issue.199

193. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 922 (coding “practical consequences” as an interpretive tool).
194. Id.
195. See Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 83, at 32.
196. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 912 (counting “dueling” as “those instances in which a majority and dissenting opinion in a case invoke the same
interpretive tool to reach different readings of the statute”).
197. Id. at 961.
198. Id. at 971.
199. Most dissent writers employ the same methodology as their fellow dissent writer; in only four or five cases did one dissent use a statutory methodology that was not employed by the other dissents. Often, this methodology was
legislative history, with one dissent writer employing legislative history to buttress their point. Moreover, about 71% of cases in the dataset concern a single
dissent. Recent Board members Philip Miscimarra and Harry Johnson have a
habit of writing very long and detailed separate dissents, a pattern that contrasts with the single dissents written during the Bush II and Clinton years.
During the earlier period, Peter Hurtgen/J. Robert Brame and Wilma Liebman/Dennis Walsh often wrote joint dissents.
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C. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AT
THE NLRB IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
The Board engaged in a mix of interpretative techniques in
the twenty-four year period under study. In Section II.C.1, I detail the general trends, pointing out differences in interpretive
methodology based on case type, partisan composition of the
panel, and presidential administration. I then turn to a detailed
empirical and doctrinal discussion of the Board’s use of each interpretive method. In Section II.C.2, I discuss the use of textualism by the Board, detailing how the Board uses textual,
Latin/language, and substantive canons of interpretation before
reviewing the Board’s use of legislative history in Section II.C.3.
Section II.C.4 discusses the use of precedent, and Section II.C.5
describes the Board’s use of policy and practical considerations
in its decision making. Finally, Section II.C.6, summarizes the
findings.
1. General Trends in Statutory Interpretation of Majority
Opinions
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics of the 168 cases in the dataset that interpreted the NLRA in majority opinions as a matter
of first impression. Not surprisingly, the full four or five member
Board heard 58% of the cases in the dataset. Each case employs
multiple tools. For instance, a Board decision could employ text,
Latin/language canons, substantive canons, legislative history,
precedent, policy, and practical considerations all in one decision, underscoring empirical support that the eclecticism Gluck
and Posner found for appellate court judges similarly applies to
administrative agencies.200 Figure 1 details the percent value for
each methodology, by case type. “Text” refers to cases in which
the Board analyzes the text in part, but the use of text is equal
to or secondary to other interpretive methods. “Plain text” references cases in which the Board primarily rests its conclusions on
the text by arguing that the text has a plain meaning that controls the outcome of the case.201

200. Gluck & Posner, supra note 91, at 1303.
201. Some scholars do not conduct significance tests because their dataset,
like the present one, consists of the entire population of cases under study. See
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 60, at 1095–96 (explaining the reason for not running significance tests). In statistics, one can assess whether a difference in two
sample means is statistically significant by conducting various statistical tests,
such as t-tests. The present study, like the others, consists of the full population
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Table 1: Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Majority Opinions (Percents)
All
All Cases

Text

Plain

Lang.

Subs.

L.H.

Prec.

Policy

Prac.

61.3

6.0

36.3

14.3

30.4

98.8

83.9

57.1

Case Type
Employer

55.7

58.1

6.5

28.0*

11.8

24.7

97.9

83.9

58.1*

Union

15.0

80.0

8.0

56.0*

24.0

48.0

100.0

72.0

32.0*

Election

29.3

59.1

4.1

44.9*

14.3

32.7

100.0

89.8

69.4*

Republican

32.1

66.7

11.1

33.3

14.8

37.0

100

70.4*

48.2

Democratic

67.9

58.8

3.5

38.6

14.0

27.2

98.3

90.4*

61.4

Clinton

51.2

54.1*

5.8

31.8

9.4

25.9

98.8

78.8*

43.5*

Bush II

28.9

64.6*

8.3

35.4

16.7

27.1

100.0

83.3*

62.5*

Obama

19.9

78.8*

3.0

54.6

24.2

45.6

97.0

100.0*

87.9*

Rep./Clinton

13.7

65.2

13.0

39.1

13.0

39.1

100.0

56.5*

21.7*

Dem./Clinton

36.9

50.0*

3.2

29.0*

8.1

21.0*

98.4

87.1

51.6*

Rep./Bush

17.9

70.0

10.0

30.0

16.7

33.3

100.0

83.3*

70.0*

Dem./Bush

10.7

55.6*

5.6

44.4*

12.5

16.7*

100.0

83.3

50.0*

Rep./Obama

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Dem./Obama

19.6

78.8*

3.0

54.6*

24.2

45.6*

97.0

100.0

87.9*

Maj. Party

Adm.

Party/Adm.

*Statistically significant at least 95% confidence. There were no applicable
Republican-majority panels during the Obama administration.

of cases, not simply a randomly drawn sample. Nonetheless, I conduct hypothesis testing by using chi-squared analysis to determine whether the means of
select groups differ from one another.
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Figure 1

Board members cite to the text or engage in some type of
textual analysis 61% of the time. However, the Board finds the
text to be controlling (or references the text being “plain”) in less
than 10% of cases (6%). Even in those cases, the Board does not
rely solely on the text. In 70% of those cases, the Board buttresses its textual argument by relying on legislative history at
least in part and they always refer to precedent. Moreover, in
80% of cases in which the Board finds the text plain, the Board
complements its textual analysis by referring to policy considerations and in 40% of these cases, the Board also references the
practical implications of its rulings. Plain meaning is used
slightly more often in cases against unions, but the differences
are not statistically significant. The Board seems to engage in at
least some textualist interpretation about two-thirds of the time,
with text used more in cases against unions, though the differences are not statistically significant. The Board uses Latin/language canons in about a third of their cases and uses substantive
canons about 14% of the time. It employs Latin/language canons
in over half of the cases against unions and in 45% of election or
bargaining unit cases, with the differences being statistically
significant. This result is not surprising because in cases against
unions or cases involving election or bargaining units, the Board
must determine who qualifies as an “employee” under the Act,
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an inquiry that seems particularly well-suited to textual analysis and invocation of language canons.202
The Board uses purposive methods, at least in part, in almost all of the decisions in the dataset. In 30% of statutory interpretation cases, the Board majority refers in part to legislative history or congressional intent, even if only second-hand or
in a general way; legislative history is extensively discussed in
18% of cases. The Board most frequently cites to legislative history in cases containing allegations of union abuses (48%).
In addition, the Board also frequently references precedent,
citing caselaw to support the outcome in 99% of cases in the dataset. Most frequently, the Board references other Board decisions in nearly all its decisions, citing them extensively in support of the statutory interpretation 44% of the time. Either
circuit court or Supreme Court precedent, however, influence a
majority of interpretations at least in part and in 6% of cases,
the Board closely mirrors the statutory construction given by an
appeals court; it is highly influential in 14%.203 Given the
Board’s stated policy of nonacqueiscence,204 this finding is surprising. Moreover, the Board cites at least one Supreme Court
decision as influencing its construction in 80% of the cases; it
finds the Supreme Court decision constraining or definitive in
16% of cases in the dataset.
In addition to legislative history and precedent, the Board
frequently cites policy and practical considerations. In 84% of
cases, the Board voices policy implications explicitly or implicitly. In some instances, the Board makes clear that the statute
leaves the agency a hole to fill and the Board must balance competing considerations.205 In other cases, the Board makes a policy choice between competing Board precedents. Given that the
Board is, at its heart, a policymaking body, it is no surprise that
policy considerations often animate choice where Congress
leaves a discernible “gap” in the law. Practical considerations
also play some role in decision making in 57% of cases, especially
in election representation and bargaining unit cases (69%), a dif-

202. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
203. See, e.g., Stauton Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 59, 59 (2001) (applying Tenth Circuit case law).
204. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 152, at 681 (discussing the practice of
agency nonacquiescence in American law).
205. See, e.g., Morgan’s Holiday Mkts., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 837, 840–41 (2001)
(balancing considerations).
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ference that is statistically significant. As detailed more fully below, these cases often concern broader issues than unfair labor
practice cases do. For example, many of these cases concern identifying individuals qualifying for protection under the NLRA,206
a conclusion that has far-reaching implications about the scope
of the Board’s jurisdiction in labor policymaking. As such, it is
not surprising that in those cases in particular, the Board often
gives consideration to practical implications.
Figure 2

Table 1 and Figure 3 also looks at the methodologies broken
down by the majority party of the panel hearing the case.207 During the period under study, 68% of the panels have Democraticmajorities, with a handful of cases being handled by split majorities.208 While Republican-dominated panels use text, plain
meaning, and legislative history more than Democratic-domi-

206. See, e.g., Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016) (adjudicating if an individual student assistant is a statutory employee).
207. There was only one Republican panel that heard relevant cases during
the Obama administration so that case was eliminated for purpose of the tables.
208. In the few cases where the party of the majority was split, for ease of
analysis, I coded the party as Democratic-dominated if the decision was in favor
of unions and Republican if the decision was in favor of the employer.
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nated panels, the differences are not statistically significant. Indeed, most striking is the fact that there are so few differences
based solely on majority party. Moreover, Democratic-majority
panels tend to use Latin/language canons (39% v. 33%), policy
(90% v. 70%), and practical implications (61% v. 48%) more than
Republican panels, though only policy is statistically significant
and it is largely limited to cases undertaken during the Clinton
administration. Both parties equally employ precedent and substantive canons.
Figure 3

Figure 4 breaks down the data by presidential administration. There is a statistically significant jump in the use of text
starting in the Bush II administration as well as an increase over
time in the use of the text, the Latin/language canons, the substantive canons, legislative history, policy, and practical considerations with the increase in text, policy, and practical considerations being statistically significant. Table 1 also looks at the
data broken down by both party and presidential administration. Of note is the fact that Democratic-majority panels have
become more textualist over time, with increased reliance on
text and the Latin/language and substantive canons especially
during the Obama administration. This is an interesting finding
considering the popular wisdom associating Democrats with a

2294

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2255

more purposive approach.209 Use of legislative history also increased during the Obama administration.
Figure 4

Table 2 and Figure 5 detail the single primary method of
interpretation in a given case. I assign each case to one of five
groups: (1) text plus (cases which rely primarily on the text
and/or text plus legislative history, often accompanied by discussion of policy and practical implications); (2) plain text (where
Board finds the text alone to be dispositive of the proper interpretation even if the Board buttresses its conclusion through
other sources); (3) legislative history primary (cases in which the
Board uses legislative history as the primary method to fill a gap
in the law to construe a statute); (4) precedent primary cases
(cases in which the Board uses some combination of Board, circuit court, or Supreme Court precedent as constraining its statutory construction); and (5) policy/balance cases (cases in which
the Board acknowledges that there is a gap in the law and the

209. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 60, at 828–29 (“[T]here is no logical or
necessary connection between adoption of ‘plain meaning’ approaches and being
‘liberal’ or ‘conservative.’ But as an empirical matter, the more conservative Justices . . . have embraced ‘plain meaning’ approaches and the more liberal justices have not.”).
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Board makes a policy-based decision either by balancing competing priorities or by considering various policy rationales and/or
practical consequences to inform statutory meaning or by making a policy choice by overruling an older Board precedent or
choosing between Board precedents to create a new rule).
Table 2: Primary Method of Statutory Interpretation: Majority Opinions
(Percents)

All Cases
Case Type
Employer
Union
Election
Maj. Party
Republican
Democratic
Adm.
Clinton
Bush II
Obama
Party/Adm.
Rep./Clinton
Dem./Clinton
Rep./Bush
Dem./Bush
Rep./Obama
Dem./Obama

Text+
19.6

Plain
3.0

L.H.
2.4

Prec.
35.7

Policy
39.3

12.9
32.0
26.5

2.2
4.0
4.1

1.1*
12.0*
0.0*

43.0*
36.0*
20.4*

40.9*
16.0*
49.0*

24.1
17.5

5.6
1.8

5.6
1.0

35.2
36.0

29.6
43.9

9.4*
25.0*
36.4*

2.4
6.3
0.0

4.7
0.0
0.0

47.1*
29.2*
15.2*

36.5
39.6
48.5

13.0
8.1*
30.0
16.7*
0.0
36.4*

4.4
1.6
6.7
5.6
0.0
0.0

13.0*
1.6
0.0*
0.0
0.0
0.0

52.2*
45.2*
23.3*
38.9*
0.0
15.2*

17.4
43.6
40.0
38.9
0.0
48.5

*Statistically significant at least 95% confidence. There were no applicable Republican-majority panels during the Obama administration.

In all, as detailed in Table 2 and Figure 5, reliance on policy
(39%) and precedent (36%) are the most common primary tool
for interpretation, with both groups together comprising nearly
three-fourths of the cases. In 29% of cases, the Board makes apparent that its statutory interpretation is highly influenced by
Supreme Court precedent.210 Likewise, 44% of cases rely heavily
on Board caselaw, while 14% cite appellate court caselaw as being very important for the interpretation. In under a fifth of
cases, the Board relies primarily on some sort of textual analysis,
though the plain meaning is the primary method in only 3% of

210. See, e.g., The Raymond F. Kravits Ctr. for the Performing Arts, 351
N.L.R.B. 143, 147 (2007) (“[W]e have decided to abandon the Board’s due process requirement for unions affiliation in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Seattle-First.”).
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cases. The Board resorts to legislative history as the primary
source for interpreting the statute in 2% of cases.
Figure 5

Figure 6 details the breakdown by case type, indicating that
cases involving union abuses as well as election and bargaining
units cases are more likely to use a text plus analysis. Claims
against unions also are more likely to invoke legislative history
as the primary source to a statistically significant degree. Further, use of precedent is more common in cases against employers to a statistically significant degree, while policy is rarely invoked as the primary method in cases against unions.
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Figure 6

Figure 7 turns to breaking down the data by partisan composition of the panel, showing that the primary interpretive
method employed is nearly identical between Republican and
Democratic-majority panels. While Republican-dominated
Boards are more likely to use text plus, plain text, and legislative
history as the primary method than their Democratic counterparts, the results are not statistically significant. Democraticmajority panels are more likely to use policy as a primary source,
but differences are not statistically significant (44% v. 30%). Further, since the text plus analysis often employs policy-based justifications in part, comparing Democratic and Republican-dominated Boards based on whether they employ either text plus or
policy reveals that they are statistically indistinguishable since
Republican Boards employ text plus slightly more than Democratic Boards.
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Figure 7

Table 2 and Figure 8 displays the primary method broken
down by presidential administration. In particular, there is a
marked increase in the text plus method over time. Whereas only
9% of Clinton era Board decisions employ text plus analysis as
the primary interpretive method, 36% of cases decisions during
the Obama period use this method, a statistically significant increase. In turn, the Bush II Board used a plain text method in
6% of the cases, compared to 2% of cases during the Clinton years
and none during the Obama years, a result that is statistically
indistinguishable. There is also a noticeable decline in the use of
precedent as the primary interpretive source in later administrations; whereas the Clinton Board decided almost half of its
statutory decisions by cobbling together precedent as the key interpretive source, the Obama Board relied on this method in only
15% of its statutory cases of first impression—a statistically significant difference. Obama Board decisions also invoked policy
considerations as the primary interpretive method 49% of the
time compared to 36% during the Clinton era and 40% during
the Bush II era. Statutory interpretation cases decided by the
Obama Board seem to employ a predictable pattern: the three
liberal Board members use primarily a text plus legislative history or policy-based approach to rule in favor of the liberal side,
with Board members writing detailed dissents attacking the reasoning of the liberal majority with a text plus approach.
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Figure 8

Table 2 also breaks down the primary method employed
based on presidential administration and the majority party of
the panel. Here again, there are noticeable differences based on
the administration. The results underscore that the party in
charge of the presidency is most likely to make its decisions with
policy considerations at the forefront, and this trend has increased over time. Moreover, text plus analysis as the primary
method of interpretation has increased over time, especially
among Democratic-dominated panels. Democratic-majority panels in the Bush II and Obama administrations were especially
likely to eschew legislative history in favor of a more policybased approach, while Republican-majority Boards during the
Clinton administration often looked to legislative history as well
as text to impose limits on labor rights. Decline in the use of
precedent as a primary interpretive method is prevalent among
both Republican and Democratic-majority panels to a statistically significant degree. As in other tables, Table 2 shows clearly
the decline of the use of precedent and the increase in the use of
both text plus and policy. Increase in the use of text plus and
policy is especially prominent for Republican-dominated panels.
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2. NLRB’s Use of Textualism, Latin/Language and
Substantive Canons
The Board engages in different types of textual analysis. In
this Section I set forth and explore each of the three typologies
in turn: (1) plain meaning textualism; (2) “expansive” textualism; and (3) textualism by reliance on Latin/language canon.
a. Plain Meaning Textualism
In the “primarily textualist” cases cited above, the Board
reads the text as mandating a certain interpretation by the clear
import of the text. Plain meaning textualism has minimal influence on how the Board interprets statutes, as the Board adopts
a plain meaning approach in less than 10% of the majority opinions studied. Even when the Board holds that the statutory text
clearly necessitates a given result, the Board goes further to examine the legislative history, precedent, policy, or practical considerations of its ruling.
The Board adopted a plain meaning textualist approach in
Alexandria Clinic, P.A.211 In that case, the Board reversed the
ALJ’s finding that the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the NLRA by terminating striking nurses.212 The Board
made clear that the text controls: “[s]ince the text of the statute
is the law and that text is crystal clear and unambiguous, no
further discussion is necessary.”213 In so ruling, the Board overruled its prior decision in Greater New Orleans,214 which had relied on legislative history to inform the meaning of the statute,
giving strikers more flexibility in the notice requirements.215 The
Board criticized the Greater New Orleans decision for using legislative history to “rewrite the statute” to make the notice requirement discretionary rather than mandatory.216 Even though
the Board found the text to be clear warranting “no further discussion,” the Board still went on to note that “policy considerations underlying Section 8(g) are effectuated” by applying it to
the striking workers in the case.217

211. Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B. 1262 (2003).
212. Id. at 1263.
213. Id. at 1265.
214. Greater New Orleans Artificial Kidney Ctr., 240 N.L.R.B. 432 (1979)
(finding no violation under section 8(g)).
215. Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B. at 1262.
216. Id. at 1265.
217. Id.
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b. Expansionist Textualism
Instead of the plain language mandating a specific result,
the Board often adopts a textualist approach to argue that the
text does not forbid a certain interpretation or that the language
of the text, when read together with surrounding language or the
text of other sections, either necessitates a given result or offers
one among many permissible interpretations of the statute. In
18% of the cases in which the Board refers at least in part to the
text, the Board makes clear the text either does not limit an interpretation or does not foreclose an alternative interpretation.
The Board most frequently uses an expansionist textual
method to rule on the breadth of coverage under the NLRA. The
Board has earned criticism for its frequent flip-flopping on the
NLRA’s reach, especially with respect to interpreting who constitutes an “employee” under the Act.218 In recent years, the
Board heard a flurry of cases concerning whether medical residents, interns, and graduate student teaching assistants (TAs)
are considered “employees” for purposes of the NLRA. After
amendments to the NLRA in the 1970s granting the Board jurisdiction over private hospitals, the Board held that residents
and teaching assistants fell outside the Act’s protection.219 By
1999, the Board, now controlled by Democrats, flip-flopped, overturning the NLRB rulings from the 1970s and extending protection to residents and TAs.220 Following another administration
change, the Board once again overturned its decisions regarding
TAs in 2004.221 Then, in 2016, the Board—again controlled by
Democrats—overturned its 2004 ruling and found that graduate
TAs in private universities were covered by the protections of the
NLRA.222
The Board’s decision in Columbia University shows how the
Board expansively interprets the Act’s words to bring additional

218. See Flynn, supra note 134, at 1363 (noting the partisan foundation of
the NLRB).
219. See, e.g., St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003–04
(1977) (holding that house staff are employees but cannot bargain); Cedar’s-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (1976) (holding that house staff are not
“employees” under the NLRA); Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621,
621 (1974) (holding that TAs are not employees); Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B.
329, 331 (1971) (asserting jurisdiction over private, nonprofit universities).
220. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000); Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330
N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
221. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004).
222. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
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people within the ambit of the NLRA.223 For at least the third
time in a decade, the Board addressed whether TAs are “employees” as defined by section 2(3) of the Act.224 The Board noted that
the Act specifically states the Act covers “any employee,” listing
several exceptions such as independent contractors.225 Because
the statute does not expressly list TAs as an exception, the Board
reasoned, teaching assistants are within the Act’s “any employee” coverage.226 Applying a modified version of expressio
unius, the inclusion of a list of persons who are not employees
suggests that a TA, not being identified, should be considered
within the definition.227 The Board frequently uses this type of
expansionist textualism in its decisions—often reciting that
“nothing in the text limits” the Board’s interpretation. Even
when using this textualist approach, the Board refers to legislative history or policy as well to supplement its expansionist reading of the statute.228
c. Latin/Language and Substantive Canons
The Board also uses Latin/language and substantive canons
to inform statutory meaning, though no case in the dataset mentions any of the Latin canons by name.229 Figure 9 details the
Latin/language and substantive canons used by the Board. Majority opinions invoke language canons between 25% and 37% of
the cases in the dataset, depending on how one defines language
canons. Substantive canons are used 14% of the time. The Board
most frequently invokes the whole text rule in over a third of its

223. Id. at *1; see also N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1209 (advancing a textualist approach to find TAs covered).
224. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. at *1.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *1–2.
227. Id. at *4–6 (“The absence of student assistants from the Act’s enumeration of categories excluded from the definition of employee is itself strong evidence of statutory coverage.”).
228. When the Board advances an expansionist “no limits” reading of the
statute, it only refers to practical implications 73% of the time.
229. Interestingly, the only time the Board invokes any of the Latin terms
by name is in contract interpretation cases. In those cases, the Board notes that
methods of statutory interpretation—such as expression unius—could also be
used to interpret the language of the contract. See, e.g., Comput. Scis. Raytheon,
318 N.L.R.B. 966, 969 (1995).
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statutory interpretation cases, relying on other parts of the statute to interpret a specific statutory provision or term.230 For instance, in interpreting whether a union committed an unfair labor practice, the Board may refer to the provisions governing
unfair labor practices against employers to inform meaning.231
The Board also frequently uses other nearby provisions to inform
meaning of a given statutory term. In other instances, the Board
refers to the “structure of the Act” as influencing its interpretation.
Figure 9

In addition to the whole text rule, the Board uses the whole
act and whole code rule to inform statutory meaning in 5% and
6% of cases, respectively. The whole act rule is most often used
when interpreting who is or is not an “employee” under the
NLRA.232 The whole code rule is most frequently invoked in
cases that require the Board to interpret the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), which the Supreme Court has stated is “analogous” to the

230. See, e.g., Milwaukee & Southeast Wis. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 318
N.L.R.B. 714, 716 (1995).
231. As an example, the Board frequently refers to section 8(a)(3) to interpret section 8(b)(1)(a) charges. See, e.g., Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B.
224, 224–225 (1995).
232. See, e.g., Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. at *1.
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NLRA.233 Much of the debate concerning the RLA centers on
whether the two acts are statutory equivalents, so that Supreme
Court precedents on the RLA can be used to inform statutory
meaning of the NLRA.234 The Board also sometimes interprets
the NLRA by looking at how other statutes such as Title VII or
the Americans with Disabilities Act interpret a similar term.235
The Board rarely relies on any of the Latin/language canons
exclusively and never mentions them by their formal name. For
clarity, I specify that the Board here uses the expressio unius
canon to include what was not expressly excluded; thus, I label
it “modified expressio unius.” Most of the cases in which the
Board uses modified expressio unius involve determinations of
whether a given “employee” comes within the ambit of the Act.236
It uses expressio unius in 2% of cases while it uses the modified
version in 6%. Further, in addition to the Latin/language canons,
the Board also uses other rules of language or grammar to inform meaning. For instance, the Board notes that the statute’s
text should be read so as to avoid redundancy or to avoid superfluities, but employs this canon in fewer than 2% of cases.237
The Board also uses Latin and language canons to advance
text-based arguments. For example, in Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, the Democratic-majority Board broadly interpreted section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA by referring to other parts of the statute,
which it held “creates no obstacle to finding that an employer
violates the Act by unilaterally discontinuing dues checkoff after
contract expiration.”238 Other provisions of the statute contain
233. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 752
(1988) the Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and the NLRA
were statutory equivalents, thus spawning disputes about when the NLRA case
is analogous to a RLA case so as to come within the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984). Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320
N.L.R.B. at 225. Some cases consider whether standards applied for the RLA
should also apply to Taft-Hartley labor unions. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1989). About 5% of the cases in the dataset concern
applicability of the RLA.
234. See Hartley, supra note 233, at 11–13.
235. See, e.g., Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774, 791–92 (2014)
(comparing NLRA and Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act); San Manual Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1058 (2005) (same).
236. See supra Part II.B.
237. See, e.g., Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 688 (2006) (“[S]ince
canons of statutory interpretation caution us to eschew a construction that
would result in redundancy, we start from the premise that each supervisory
function is to be accorded a separate meaning.”).
238. Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, 362 N.L.R.B. 1655, 1657–58 (2015).
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an express requirement that there be “written agreement.”239
The Board reasoned that “Congress’ explicit decision to condition
the lawfulness” of another activity on a “written agreement with
the employer” and the “conspicuous absence of this requirement”
in another statutory section demonstrates that “Congress did not
intend the viability of a dues-checkoff arrangement to depend on
the existence of an unexpired collective-bargaining agreement.”240 The Board went on to chide the prior Board for ignoring
the statutory language of two other sections of the statute which
were “enacted by the same Congress at the same time” that
treated dues checkoffs “quite differently.”241 As the Board states,
“[t]he language of the . . . proviso makes clear that when Congress wanted to make an employment term, such as union security, dependent on the existence of a contract, Congress knew
how to do so.”242 The Board buttressed its analysis with policy
arguments and legislative history.243
Finally, the Board often relies on any of the substantive canons, a finding contrary to what Krishnakumar finds in her study
of the Roberts Court.244 The Board often uses two substantive
rules that deal the relationship between the Board and Congress. In 7% of cases, the Board expressly notes that Congress
failed to “clearly state” that one interpretation is intended, and
so, by implication, the opposite interpretation must stand.245
Further, in 8% of cases, the Board infers congressional inaction
as indicating legislative acquiescence of the way the Board interpreted the statute in prior decisions. For instance, in its 2004
239. Id. at 1657 (“Congress’ treatment of employer payments to employee
trust funds [in another provision of the statute] further illustrates that Congress contemplated that dues-checkoff arrangements could survive contract expiration.”).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1660–61.
242. Id. at 1661.
243. Id. at 1660 n.17 (“[T]he policies of the Act strongly support a finding
that dues checkoff should be included with the overwhelming majority of terms
and conditions of employment that remain in effect even after the contract containing them expires.”).
244. Cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 926–27 (finding substantive canons of little use during Roberts Court).
245. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 806 (2010) (noting that there was “no clear indication …that Congress intended … to proscribe” conduct) (internal citations
omitted); Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1265 (2003) (noting that
“if Congress had intended to allow either party to extend notice unilaterally, it
could have easily done so—but it did not. Instead the Congress carved out a
single express exception.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Brevard Achievement decision, the Board contends that disabled
people are not “employees” under the NLRA because Congress
has seemingly been aware of Board decisions on the topic and
chose not to adopt legislation modifying the interpretation
reached by the Board.246
In a handful of cases, the Board invokes the constitutional
avoidance canon to guide its decision making. While 6% of cases
in the dataset raise First Amendment concerns, only 2% of cases
expressly invoke the constitutional avoidance canon.247 An employer may argue that a statement it made is protected free
speech, and the Board in some instances uses the constitutional
avoidance canon to guide its determinations so as to avoid dealing with the issue. In one case, the Board invokes the Native
American sovereignty canon, particularly in cases concerning
the NLRB’s jurisdiction over Native American casinos.248 Under
this substantive canon, a statute should be interpreted so as to
guard Native sovereignty.249 The Board has also applied the
principle against interpreting a statute so as to extend beyond
the territorial boundaries of the United States in one case.250 Interestingly, in these cases the majority adopted a policy-based
approach, while the dissent argued that the substantive canon
should apply to reach the opposite result.
3. NLRB’s Use of Legislative History
Majority Board decisions frequently invoke legislative history. Almost a third of the decisions in the dataset refer to legislative history at least in part, with legislative history playing a
primary part in the majority’s interpretation in about a fifth of
the cases. The Board relies on a mix of legislative materials. I
code for five sources of legislative history: (1) conference committee reports (often considered to be the most authoritative source

246. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 988 (2004).
247. For example, in United Food, the Board notes that it wants to interpret
the statute to avoid constitutional collisions with the First Amendment. See
United Food, 334 N.L.R.B. 852, 854–57 (2001).
248. In San Miguel Indian Bingo, the Board’s rules on whether the NLRB
can exercise jurisdiction over Native American casinos, discussing in part the
canon against construing legislation against Native Americans. See San Miguel
Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1066–70 (2004).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1107 (2001) (asserting jurisdiction); Int’l Longshoreman Ass’n, 313 N.L.R.B. 412, 417 (1993)
(asserting jurisdiction).
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of legislative history);251 (2) House or Senate Committee reports;
(3) statements by sponsors, conference chairman, committee
chairman or other Congressman in the Congressional Record or
in the legislative history; (4) general references to the legislative
or amendment process, including references to the 1959 and
1974 amendment processes; and (5) indirect or direct references
to legislative history noted in Board, circuit court, or Supreme
Court caselaw or law review articles that are cited in the opinion
but with no specific citation to a traditional source of legislative
history. For example, where a decision simply states, “The legislative history says X,” and does not cite to a source, I code the
decision as category 5. However, where a decision refers to legislative history and cites Board or Supreme Court caselaw rather
than citing directly to the legislative history, I look to the
caselaw to determine how to code the decision. If the caselaw
cites directly to one of the other four categories, then I code the
decision citing the caselaw as using legislative history in the specific category. If the caselaw contains only a general statement
about legislative history that does not include a specific citation
to one of the other four categories, then I code the decision as
category five.
Figure 10 shows the breakdown of legislative history used
in majority opinions based on only the one-third of majority opinions where legislative history was employed. About a third of the
citations to legislative history concern broad, indirect references
to congressional intent gathered from statements in caselaw or
law reviews. This finding may trouble those who advocate for the
use of legislative history to aid agencies in interpreting legislation, since it is clear that the Board relies heavily on second-hand
sources to garner legislative meaning. Moreover, only 20% of the
citations to legislative history are to what is often hailed as the
most authoritative source of legislative intent—conference committee reports.252 More often, the Board cites to statements in
the congressional committee reports (45%) or the Congressional
Record (39%). In 41% of cases employing legislative history, the
Board also cites to the amendment process or compares and contrasts bills that may have been defeated in committee or on the

251. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 977.
252. Id. at 976–78; Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 83, at 44, 70
(finding that compared to the Supreme Court, district courts cite committee reports as the most cited piece of legislative history).
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floor to ascribe present meaning to a statute.253 Although the
Board mostly cites to statements by the floor manager or sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act or its amendments, the Board occasionally also refers to congressional debate, referencing colloquies in the Congressional Record between two Congressman
debating different parts of the bill.254
Figure 10

The Board generally invokes legislative history to inform
the statute’s scope and purpose, make broad references to general congressional purpose or intent, and less often, to simply
note that nothing in the legislative history forecloses the majority’s given reading of the text.255 The cases themselves can be
253. For example, in Alessio Construction, the Board cites to the compromises made in Senate and House bills; the House bill was ultimately adopted.
See Alessio Constr., 310 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1027 (1993).
254. See, e.g., Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 263, 160 (1999) (citing colloquy in Congressional Record).
255. Gluck & Bressman and Walker similarly find that legislative history
helps explain the purpose of the statute, with 80% of respondents in the Walker
survey also noting that legislative history helped define terms. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 971 fig. 7; Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at
1040. As one respondent in the Walker survey put it, “[l]egislative history can
help to clarify Congress’s purpose in enacting particular provisions, which in
turn can help the Agency resolve ambiguities in a way that is consistent with
legislative intent.” Id. at 1042.
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divided into four different legislative history typologies: (1) legislative history as limiting the text; (2) legislative history as a
“plus factor” in informing the statute’s scope and purpose; (3)
legislative history as not foreclosing a certain interpretation; and
(4) legislative history as an irrelevant factor.
a. Legislative History as Limiting the Text
In a small subset of cases (less than 5% of cases in the dataset), the Board relies on legislative history as the primary interpretive method. In most of these cases, the Board invokes legislative history to support a narrow interpretation of the NLRA.
For instance, in Alessio Construction,256 the Board invoked legislative history to interpret the meaning of section 8(e) of the
statute.257 The Board looked at the plain text but relied primarily on legislative history to inform the meaning of the statute.258
Due to the somewhat temporary and haphazard nature of construction work, Congress carved out an exception to the NLRA
regarding the construction industry by giving construction workers (who often can only work in the warmer months) more leeway
to engage in boycotts.259 The Board held that this exception
should be narrowly construed to include only construction practices in existence at the time of enactment—1959.260 The Board
reasoned “[a] careful examination of the legislative history of the
proviso reveals little affirmative evidence that Congress would
have chosen to protect the anti-dual-shop clause if such clause
existed in 1959.”261 In so doing, the Board selectively included
isolated snippets of legislative history, citing some parts and
stating that contrary parts were simply irrelevant.262 Relying on
that narrow slice of legislative history, the Board found the union in violation of the NLRA.263 The Board also created precedent
for interpreting section 8(e) in accordance with Congress’s intent
(as revealed by the legislative history) to “preserve the status
quo and the pattern of collective bargaining in the construction
256. Alessio Constr., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1027.
257. Id. at 1023–27.
258. Id. at 1024.
259. Id. at 1025.
260. Id. at 1026.
261. Id. at 1027.
262. Id. at 1024, 1027–31. For instance, the Board said that somewhat contrary statements by the bill’s sponsor, Senator John Kennedy were too “ambiguous” to support a contrary reading of the statute, despite what the dissent argued. Id. at 1028.
263. Id. at 1023.
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industry at the time the legislation was passed.”264 Interestingly,
of the cases included in the dataset, only Republican-dominated
Boards use legislative history as a limiter to narrowly foreclose
relief to the affected party.
b. Legislative History as a “Plus” Factor
In the vast majority of cases in the dataset in which the
Board relies on legislative history, the Board uses it as a “plus”
factor to inform statutory scope and purpose beyond what the
text dictates. In almost two-thirds of the cases in which the
Board cites legislative history, it does so in a non-trivial matter.
Moreover, in about a fifth of all cases in the dataset, legislative
history serves as a major cornerstone of the analysis. Sometimes,
the Board finds that legislative history clarifies ambiguous text
while in other cases, the Board relies on legislative history as a
“plus” factor in confirming the Board’s plain meaning analysis.
For instance, in the Lincoln Lutheran case discussed above
concerning whether dues checkoff can survive expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Board not only relies on the
plain text and Latin/language canons to inform its analysis, but
also cites a direct statement of Senator Taft, chairman of the
Senate Labor Committee. In a statement made during a debate
on the Taft-Hartley amendments, Senator Taft notes that the
employer’s “obligation may continue indefinitely until revoked.”265 Thus, while legislative history does not form the cornerstone of the Board’s analysis, the Board relies on it as further
evidence that its interpretation of the Act’s scope is reasonable.
c. Legislative History as Not Foreclosing a Certain
Interpretation
In 29% of cases in the dataset in which the Board invokes
legislative history, it does so in a negative way, arguing that
since nothing in the legislative history limits the majority’s interpretation, the statute must, by implication, be interpreted in
a particular way. This particular use of legislative history is perhaps the most troubling. The legislative history of the NLRA
264. Id. at 1027. Specifically, the Board relied on a statement from the House
Conference Report that the construction proviso was not meant to
“change . . . the present state of the law” as signifying that the proviso should
be interpreted according to the “status quo” of the enacting legislature. Id. at
1028.
265. Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, 362 N.L.R.B. 1655, 1659 n.17 (2015) (citing
93 CONG. REC. 4876, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1311 (1947)).
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spans many pages, so it is a tall order to say that nothing in the
entire legislative history contradicts a given interpretation.
Nonetheless, the Board often uses this technique to anchor policy-based arguments, perhaps seeking to afford these arguments
greater legitimacy by reference to congressional intent.
d. Legislative History as Irrelevant
Finally, in some cases, the Board wholly ignores legislative
history, even if the text is unclear. In Service Employees International Union,266 the Republican-dominated Board was called on
to determine whether a party was a “neutral” under the term’s
common law definition. In holding that the party was not neutral, the Board found a violation of the NLRA’s secondary boycott
provisions.267 The Board cited extensively to Senator Taft’s
statements, including his interpretation of the word “neutral” as
meaning, “wholly unconcerned” in the disagreement.268 The
Board, however, applied a different test, noting that while on its
surface, “the legislative history of these provisions would seem
to be relatively clear and similarly argue for an extremely narrow interpretation of the term ‘neutral,’” policy concerns required a broader interpretation of the statutory term.269
4. NLRB’s Use of Precedent
The Board regularly relies on precedent to inform statutory
meaning in almost all of its statutory interpretation cases. When
deciding issues of first impression, the Board looks to the Supreme Court, circuit court, and Board precedent to determine
whether anything in prior caselaw constrains the policy choice
currently before the Board. In other instances, the Board looks
to Supreme Court precedent as an authoritative source to guide
the Board in making the right decision to fill the policy hole. For
instance, in International Paper, a three-member panel of the
Board addressed a question of first impression: whether an employer that has already locked out its bargaining unit and subcontracted work out on a temporary basis can take the further
step of subcontracting out work on a more permanent basis.270
To answer this question the Board looked to Supreme Court
266. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 639 (1999).
267. Id. at 647, 649.
268. Id. at 640.
269. Id. (noting that “[a]s clear as the legislative intent may appear, however, its boundaries . . . have consequently produced much additional gloss”).
270. Int’l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1254 (1995).
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precedent to ascertain whether the scenarios presented were
analogous to other scenarios in which such conduct was held to
be unlawful.271 In this case, the appellate court disagreed with
the Board’s ruling, finding that it misapplied Supreme Court
precedent to arrive at the wrong answer.272
Rulings from appellate courts can also prompt the Board to
alter policy. In Mississippi Power & Light, the Board ruled on
whether dispatchers are “supervisors” within the meaning of the
NLRA.273 As part of its reasoning, the Board referenced many
other circuit court decisions finding that dispatchers are not supervisors.274 Similarly, in Martin Luther, the Board looked to
D.C. Circuit precedent for guidance on whether certain work
rules chill section 7 rights.275 However, in many cases, the Board
rejects the guidance of appellate courts, preferring instead to
rely on its own precedent or policy considerations, for which it is
later chided by appellate courts.276
5. NLRB’s Use of Policy and Practical Considerations
The Board frequently engages in a policy-based approach to
inform statutory meaning, with almost half of the cases in the
dataset primarily relying on policy as the cornerstone of its
choice between two or more permissible constructions of the statute. Another large group of cases relies on policy considerations
as a secondary source to buttress the text and/or the text and
legislative history. The Board’s use of policy-based approaches
falls into two main camps: (1) an “all hands on deck” approach
where the Board equally looks at text, legislative history, policy,
and practical considerations to inform the meaning, with the
“purpose” of the statutory scheme occupying center stage in the
analysis; and (2) a policy-based approach where the Board either
expressly or implicitly decides the case by making a policy choice
with little to no discussion of the text or legislative history because there is a discernible “gap” or “hole” in the statute for the
Board to fill. In most of the cases in this second category, the

271. Id.
272. Int’l Paper Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (refusing to
enforce Board order, disagreeing with application of Supreme Court precedent).
273. Miss. Power & Light Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 965, 968–69 (1999).
274. Id. at 969–71.
275. Martin Luther Mem’l Home., Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004).
276. See, e.g., Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774, 780 (2014) (rejecting the guidance of the Fifth Circuit).
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Board rests its analysis on a balancing of competing factors, often citing to precedent to define the factors for consideration.
These choices may also include practical considerations, such as
whether a given policy will foster inequality in bargaining
power, whether it could potentially lead to uproar in the workplace, or whether it is likely to increase the number of strikes in
derogation of congressional intent. In all, the majority of cases
in the dataset rely on policy considerations as a central element
of the analysis, either expressly or implicitly.277
a. “All Hands on Deck” Purposive Approach
Under the “all hands on deck” approach, the statute’s “purpose” is the central lynchpin of the analysis, with the text and
legislative history examined for their ability to shed light on congressional purpose. The issue with this methodology, however,
is that both Democratic and Republican Boards premise these
arguments on the idea that the Act only has one purpose; they
fail to acknowledge let alone reconcile the fact the Act has multiple and somewhat competing purposes.278 Framing statutory
interpretation in terms of “purpose” thus leads the Board to frequently shift its interpretation of the statute as the partisan majority of the Board changes. In most cases in which the Board
adopts this approach, it finds that the text of the statute neither
mandates nor forecloses a given interpretation. Legislative history is often of no help as it is used by both the majority and
dissent to competing ends, with each side finding something in
the legislative history to anchor its policy-based prescription. As
such, the Board, unfettered from the text of the statute with only
vague references to legislative intent to guide it, can fashion a
statutory analysis based on competing policy aims.
For example, in Brown University, the Board ruled on
whether graduate TAs qualified as “employees” under the Act.279
The predecessor case New York University and the subsequent

277. Because much of the Board’s interpretation is so caselaw-based it is difficult to tease out exactly how they are interpreting statutes as they cite to Supreme Court or Board decisions, which in turn have internal citations to statutory interpretation or references to legislative history. Moreover, in about a
third of cases in the dataset, the Board opines on the practical implications of
its rulings, such as the impact imposing a strict deadline will have on striking
words if they strictly read the text. See Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B.
1262, 1262 (2003).
278. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2020.
279. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004).
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case Columbia University both apply a textualist approach, looking at the plain meaning of the statute. In Brown University, the
Republican-majority Board also adopted a textualist approach
but framed its decision largely in terms of congressional purpose.280 The Board opined that the NLRA’s fundamental purpose
is to cover “economic relationships.”281 Because collective bargaining by students at schools does not further the purpose of
the Act as intended by Congress, the Board held that graduate
TAs are not employees.282 The Board also reasoned that to include TAs within the ambit of the Act infringes upon academic
freedom.283 By contrast, in Columbia University, the Board
adopted am “all hands on deck” approach, using textualism, legislative history, policy, and practical considerations to give
meaning to the statute.284 It too adopted a text-based purposive
analysis, but the Democratic-dominated Board conceived of a different statutory purpose than the Republican-majority Brown
University Board. As the Columbia University Board reasoned,
“[p]ermitting student assistants to choose whether they wish to
engage in collective bargaining—not prohibiting it—would further the Act’s policies.”285
The Board also used this approach in deciding whether medical residents qualify as employees under the NLRA. In Boston
Medical Center, the Board relied on a multi-factor analysis, using text, legislative history, policy, and pragmatic considerations.286 The Board emphasized the text, noting the language of
the NLRA is broad, and that the term “employee” specifically
“include[s] any employee.”287 It went further to discuss residents’
job functions in light of the dictionary definition of employee.288
The Board then looked at other statutory language, such as section 2(12)(b).289 The Board buttressed its conclusion by referring
to legislative history.290 Finally, the Board looked to caselaw,
policy and pragmatic considerations.291
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 486–89.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489–90.
Id. at 493.
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *6 (Aug. 23, 2016).
Id. at *7.
Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 159–65 (1999).
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 162–63 (noting that the “legislative history is very persuasive”).
Id. at 163–65.
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b. Balancing Policy Concerns
In other cases, the Board largely rests its decision on policy,
eschewing text and legislative history in its analysis. These
cases involve a clear gap in the law never contemplated by the
enacting Congress or addressed in any significant way in the legislative history. For example, the Board applies a completely policy-driven, purposivist approach in Browning-Ferris Industries,
in which the Board adjusts the standard for determining
whether an entity qualifies as a “joint employer.”292 The Board
stated that it was adjusting the test for determining joint-employer status to “best serve the Federal policy of ‘encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining.’”293 In so doing,
the Board looked to modern realities of how the prior test had
been implemented in practice, and decided to adopt a broader
standard so as to effectuate the Act’s purpose of facilitating collective bargaining.294 The Board noted that the nature of the
workplace has changed, citing statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics detailing the prevalence of temporary and subcontracting arrangements.295 Failure to broaden the standard, the
Board argued, would amount to an abdication of its responsibilities to “adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial
life.”296 Citing Supreme Court caselaw dictating that the Board
should follow the common law agency test in determining employment relationships, the Board reasoned that the NLRA did
not foreclose the Board from adopting the broader standard.297
As the Board argued “reevaluating doctrines, refining legal
rules, and sometimes reversing precedent are familiar parts of
the Board’s work—and rightly so.”298
Similarly in Auciello Iron Works, the Board made a policy
choice buttressed by Board and Supreme Court precedent.299 In

292. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at *2 (Aug.
27, 2015).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at *15.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *17.
298. Id. at *24. The Board cites to the Supreme Court in noting that “[t]he
use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development …of the
national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
299. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 364, 369 (1995).
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that case, the Board ruled on whether the employer could present evidence of its good faith doubt as to the level of the union’s
majority support.300 The First Circuit remanded the case to the
Board to provide “policy guidance” and to address caselaw from
other circuits.301 The Board reasoned that both policy and “practicalities support the rule that, if an employer is aware of objective evidence to support a good-faith doubt before the union accepts its offer [to bargain in good faith], it must, for the defense
to be timely raised, act on this doubt before the union accepts its
offer.”302
6. Conclusions About NLRB Majority’s Use of Statutory
Methods
The Board uses a mix of methods to interpret statutory
terms. While policy concerns and precedent predominate in informing statutory meaning, the Board also engages in more traditional statutory interpretation processes, relying on the plain
meaning of the text itself, and on how the text relates to other
parts of the statute or code. Moreover, the Board frequently invokes legislative history, but such invocation has been somewhat
uneven. Majority Boards cite to widely varying sources of legislative history, ranging from conference reports to statements in
the Congressional Record. In many instances, however, the
Board simply pronounces that the legislative history supports
one thing or another, often without any citation except to
caselaw.
All in all, Republican-dominated Boards as a whole are no
more likely than Democratic-dominated Boards to engage in a
textualist approach, and Democrats are no more likely to be purposivists than Republican-majority Boards. While there are intriguing partisan patterns, ideology does not seem to dictate
methodological choice to any great extent. Rather, the analysis
indicates that Board members selectively use statutory methods
of interpretation to advance legal or policy objectives. The eclecticism uncovered by Gluck and Posner in the judicial context
seems to be equally true for administrative adjudication, at least
with respect to the NLRB.303
Certain statutory methods seem to change over time. Decisions based on policy or a mix of text and policy have increased
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 364.
NLRB v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 980 F.2d 804, 813 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 812.
Gluck & Posner, supra note 91, at 1330.
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over time while use of precedent has declined. Use of legislative
history as a primary interpretive source has decreased over the
years since the Clinton administration, a trend that Walker
found as well among his survey respondents, although it is often
used to support a textual or policy-based argument.304
The Board frequently refers to the whole text, whole act, or
whole code rules, though not by name, in a third of its statutory
interpretation cases. That the Board often interprets words consistently throughout a statute may be problematic. Respondents
in the Gluck and Bressman survey note “significant organizational barriers that the committee system, bundled legislative
deals, and lengthy, multidrafter statutes pose to the realistic operation of these rules.”305 While “consistent usage” of a similar
term may be the “goal,” in reality, Congress often fails to achieve
this.306 Moreover, in a small but significant number of decisions,
the Board interprets congressional inaction as signaling congressional acceptance of its decisions;307 given the somewhat uneven
nature of congressional oversight, this assumption may be problematic. Thus, in construing the text, the Board may believe that
the NLRA was written with greater internal consistency than it
actually was and that Congress operates with more intention
than it actually does.
D. “DUELING” STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS
Almost three-quarters (70%) of the Board majority decisions
in the dataset include a dissent. The dissent “teams” are somewhat consistent. During the Clinton administration, Board
members J. Peter Hurtgen and J. Robert Brame often united in
dissent, whereas during the Bush II administration, Wilma

304. Walker finds that many rule drafters commented on the declining usefulness of legislative history. Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1040. As
one respondent in his survey notes: “Legislative history is sometimes useful, but
it is becoming less so. Congress puts less time into drafting legislative history
that is useful to interpretation of the statute and leaving more of the work to
agencies. The administrative rulemaking process is taking on a larger role in
shaping the rules that actually apply to the country.” Id.
305. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 5, at 936.
306. Id. at 937.
307. See, e.g., Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 988 (2004)
(noting that “[a]lthough Congress has not hesitated to correct the Board in the
past when it has departed from applying the Act as Congress intended it, it has
not done so here”); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055,
1058–59 (2004) (interpreting defeated effort as meaning that there was “no indication that Congress intended to exclude tribal enterprises from the Act”).
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Liebman and Dennis Walsh regularly dissented from the majority. In the Obama years, Republicans Philip Miscimarra and
Harry Johnson frequently wrote long detailed dissents. The proclivity to dissent has increased over time; whereas Board members dissent in just 58% of the statutory interpretation cases in
the dataset during the Clinton administration, the number of
dissents rises to 83% and 88%, respectively, during the Bush II
and Obama administrations.
Section II.D.1 briefly provides the general background of the
methods used by dissenting members, followed by a detailed assessment in Section II.D.2 concerning the extent to which the
majority and dissenting Board members use either similar or
conflicting methodologies in interpreting statutory terms. Board
members may “duel” with each other in a textual matter by (1)
focusing on different words; (2) focusing on the text of different
statutes or alleging a conflict between the NLRA and a given
statute; or (3) focusing on the same word but ascribing a different meaning to the term.308 Purposivists can also “duel” with
each other by (1) focusing on different, competing purposes; (2)
focusing on the same purpose but drawing different conclusions
about that purpose; or (3) focusing on a broad, general statutory
purpose while the competing opinion focuses on narrowly drawn
specific purposes.309
1. Methodologies Used in Dissents
Majority and dissenting Board opinions use similar interpretive methods, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 11 detailing the
primary interpretive method used by dissents. Percentages are
within a few points of the numbers provided previously for majority opinions. Dissenting opinions tend to rely less on precedent than majority opinions do (29% v. 36% in majority opinions). Policy considerations form the cornerstone of 43%
dissenting opinions, a slight increase from the 39% of majority
opinions who rely primarily on policy, and a smaller share of dissenting opinions use legislative history compared to majority
opinions. The use of text plus is slightly more common in dissenting opinions.

308. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 961.
309. Id. at 971.
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Table 3: Primary Method of Statutory Interpretation: Dissenting Opinions
(Percents)
All Cases
Case Type
Employer
Union
Election
Maj. Party
Republican
Democratic
Adm.
Clinton
Bush II
Obama
Party/Adm.
Rep./Clinton
Dem./Clinton
Rep./Bush
Dem./Bush
Rep./Obama
Dem./Obama

Text+
22.9

Plain
4.2

L.H.
1.0

Prec.
28.8

Policy
43.2

18.8
35.7
25.0

3.1
0.0
7.5

1.6
0.0
0.0

37.5*
35.7*
12.5*

39.1
28.6
55.0

19.5
31.6

1.3*
10.5*

0.0
2.6

29.9
21.1

49.4
34.2

14.3
27.5
31.0

0.0
7.5
6.9

0.0
2.5
0.0

36.7
27.5
17.2

49.0
35.0
44.8

8.1*
44.4
23.1*
29.6
33.3*
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
11.1
3.7
50.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
0.0
0.0

32.4
33.3
46.2
18.5
18.5
0.0

59.5
22.2
30.8
37.0
44.4
50.0

*Statistically significant at least 95% confidence. There were no applicable Republican-minority panels during the Obama administration.
Figure 11
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Table 3 details the primary interpretive method used in dissenting opinions, broken down by case type, political party of the
dissenters, and presidential administration. There are some noticeable changes compared to majority opinions in Table 1. Use
of the text-plus method increased over time, particularly for Republican-minority dissenters; Republican dissenters used text
plus 8% during the Clinton years, 23% during Bush II years, and
33% during the Obama years—a statistically significant increase. Republican-minority dissenters differed statistically
from Democratic-minority dissenters in the use of plain text as
a primary method to a statistically significant degree (1% v.
11%). Dissenters during the Clinton administration relied on
precedent in over a third of their dissents in the 1990s, but by
the Bush administration, they began to eschew precedent, engaging in more text-based debates with the majority, with only
17% of cases using precedent as the primary method in the
Obama years. This decline occurred among both Democratic and
Republican-minority dissenters. Further, the use of policy as the
main interpretive tool for dissenting opinions declined during
the Bush II administration, picking up again during the Obama
administration. As with majority opinions, use of method differed by case type to a statistically significant degree; whereas
38% of employer cases and 36% of union cases used precedent as
the primary interpretive method, only 13% of cases involving
elections or bargaining unit determinations used this method.
2. Dueling Interpretations in the Majority and Dissent
By necessity, the statutory method used by the dissent may
in part depend on the statutory method employed by the majority. I code cases according to one of seven “dueling” possibilities:
(1) textual to purposivist/policy (that is, the majority opinion is
primarily textual, but the dissenting opinion is more purposivist/policy); (2) purposivist to textual; (3) policy, indicating that
the majority and dissent “duel” primarily over how to balance a
given policy, with the majority favoring one policy aim while the
dissent favors another; (4) textual to textual, meaning that the
majority and dissent both adopt a textual interpretation, but
they differ as to what the text means; (5) debates about the use
of precedent, with both the dissent and majority advancing different caselaw to make their case; (6) disputes about which statute to apply; and (7) debates about everything, including text,
precedent, policy, and practical implications, and where applica-
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ble, legislative history. In many opinions, majority and dissenting Board members bicker over more than one of these things;
they may quarrel over the breadth of the text, the wisdom of using legislative history, which precedent to apply, and what the
policy and practical implications will be of a given ruling.
Table 4 and Figure 12 details the percentages broken down
by the primary type of “duel.” The most frequent “duels” concern
disputes between the majority and dissent disagreeing on almost
everything, including text, precedent, policy, practical implications, and if applicable, legislative history; 2% of the dispute concern disputes about everything. Debates also often concern precedent (26%) or policy (40%). It can be difficult to separate the
two; a debate about precedent may implicitly be a debate about
policy. For purposes of this analysis, dueling opinions are coded
as centering on precedent if the two sides quarrel over which
precedent to apply. Dueling opinions are coded as centering on
policy where the Board is called on to make a policy choice to fill
a noticeable gap in the statutory scheme. In some cases, the opposing sides debate whether the Board should adopt a new rule.
In other cases, one side argues that precedent controls the outcome while the other side reasons that the case should be decided
according to text, policy, and/or legislative history.
Table 4: Dueling Statutory Methods: Comparing Majority and Dissenting
Opinions on Primary Statutory Method (Percents)
All Cases
Case Type
Employer
Union
Election
Maj. Party
Republican
Democratic
Adm.
Clinton
Bush II
Obama
Party/Adm.
Rep./Clinton
Dem./Clinton
Rep./Bush
Dem./Bush
Rep./Obama
Dem./Obama

T>P
3.4

P<T
3.4

T>T
1.7

Prec.
26.3

Policy Statute
39.8
2.5

All
22.9

3.1
7.1
2.5

1.6
0.0
7.5

0.0
7.1
2.5

37.5*
7.1*
15.0*

37.5
21.4
50.0

0.0*
21.4*
0.0*

20.3
35.7
22.5

5.0
2.6

10.0*
0.0*

2.5
1.3

30.0
24.4

27.0*
46.2*

2.5
2.6

22.5
23.0

2.0
5.0
3.5

2.0
7.5
0.0

2.0
2.5
0.0

36.7
22.5
13.8

42.9
35.0
41.4

2.0
2.5
3.5

12.2*
25.0*
37.9*

8.3
0.0
3.6
8.3
0.0
3.5

8.3
0.0
10.7
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
2.7
3.6
0.0
0.0
0.0

58.3*
29.7
17.9*
33.3
0.0
13.8

8.3
55.1
35.7
33.3
0.0
41.4

0.0
2.7
3.3
0.0
0.0
3.5

16.7
10.8*
25.0
25.0*
0.0
37.9*

*Statistically significant at least 95% confidence. There were no applicable
Republican-minority panels during the Obama administration.
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Figure 12

On occasion, the majority and dissent also debate over how
the text should be interpreted. Majority and dissenting opinions
quarrel over whether the text should be interpreted in an expansionist or narrow fashion in about a quarter of cases. In 5% of
cases, the majority and dissent specifically debate the applicability of the whole text, whole act, or whole code rules (though
they are not referred to by name).310 In 3% of cases, the majority
and dissent quarrel over which statute takes precedence where
there is a conflict between the NLRA and another statute.311
These numbers are similar when broken down by case type,
with some interesting differences as shown in Figure 13. Policy
duels are most common in cases against employers and cases involving elections or bargaining units. Employer cases are by far
the most frequent, so the Board already has a great deal of precedent to rely on, and there is little need for new textual interpretation. For election cases, there are often few rules so the Board
must devise them. Moreover, there is not much legislative his-

310. See, e.g., Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, 362 N.L.R.B. 1655, 1658–62
(2015) (majority and dissent debating applicability of section 302(c)(4)).
311. This is why we see the sharp uptake up to 21% in election cases under
“Statute” in Table 4. These cases primarily concern whether or not to apply the
Railway Labor Act.
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tory to review concerning unfair labor practices against employers as they are covered by the Wagner Act, not the newer TaftHartley Act.312 In almost one-quarter of unfair labor cases concerning union abuses, the majority and dissent quarrel over
which statute to apply, a difference that is statistically significant.313 Cases alleging employer abuses often involve debates
over precedent (38%), a figure which is statistically significant.
Figure 13

Breaking the data down by the party of the majority and the
presidential administration in Figure 14 and Figure 15, the use
of policy has increased over time while the use of precedent has
decreased, though the differences are not statistically significant. There is a statistically significant increase over time in the
use of the last category, debates about everything, from 12% during the Clinton years to 38% by the Obama administration. An
increase in the use of policy is especially apparent for Republican-majority panels during the Bush II years. Democratic-majority panels more often debate policy than Republican-majority
panels, a difference that is statistically significant. Purposive to
312. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
313. In unfair labor disputes against unions, the Board often “duels” with
the dissent over whether the Railway Labor Act should guide its determinations. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
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text debates are also more common for Republican-majority panels than Democratic ones.
Figure 14

Figure 15
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Majority and dissenting Board members also often “duel” on
textual meaning, at least in part. In most cases these duels take
one of three forms: (1) one side argues for an expansionist interpretation of a term while the other side contends that the term
should be interpreted more narrowly, argues that policy considerations should predominate, or suggests that the legislative history demonstrates a congressional purpose that should inform
textual meaning; (2) one side argues that certain Latin/language
canons should be applied to inform the meaning of the term
while the dissent holds the canons inapplicable; or (3) one side
finds the text’s meaning plain while the other finds it ambiguous.314 For instance, as discussed previously in Alexandria
Clinic, P.A., the Republican-dominated Board argues that the
text is “clear and unambiguous” and that the Board’s reliance on
legislative history in the previously-decided Greater New Orleans was inappropriate.315 The Democratic dissenters, however,
argued that the text is “ambiguous” and “unclear.”316 The three
graduate student TA cases likewise show how the Board flipflops, with the majority and dissent following different approaches. Democratic Board members in New York University,
Brown University, and Columbia University all favored an expansionist, textual approach, while Republican Board members
relied on policy considerations to contend that graduate students
were not TAs, arguing that the non-economic nature of the relationship necessitated that TAs fall outside the coverage of the
Act.317
Likewise, majority and dissenting Board members duel over
legislative history. In about a third of decisions in the dataset,
both sides cite “dueling” legislative history where the majority
and dissent cite to different statements in the legislative history
to illustrate contrasting points. Again, the nature of dueling over
legislative history can take a few forms: (1) one side argues that
legislative history informs meaning while the other disputes this
characterization; (2) both sides feel legislative history aids in interpretation but they disagree about its purpose or the sources
that should be employed; or (3) one side cites to legislative history and the other completely ignores the opposing side’s reference to it.

314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra Part II.C.2.a.
Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1265 (2003).
Id.
See supra Part II.C.2.a.
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Both the majority and dissent duel over the use of precedent,
especially regarding whether appellate court precedent should
govern a given case. In most cases where there is a dissent, the
majority cites to caselaw, but the dissent rejects the majority rationale with either a policy argument, or by contending that the
text and/or the text and legislative history dictate the outcome.
Board members also bicker over the applicable precedent. One
side argues that Board precedent applies while the other side
contends that either the Supreme Court or the circuit courts
should govern the outcome of the case. Further, in a majority of
cases involving precedent duels, the Board’s battle is internal—
both sides agree that Board precedent dictates the outcome, but
the two sides quarrel over how the precedent should be applied.
In another group of cases, the Board bickers over how to apply
Supreme Court precedent. The Board frequently disagrees on
whether the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Railway Labor
Act cases should apply to provide insight into a given dispute.318
Thus, the malleability of arguments from precedent may suggest
that these duels are more accurately characterized as disagreement about policy.
Likewise, majorities and dissents battle over the use of policy. For example, in Alexandria Clinic, P.A., the majority opinion
and the dissent battled over the primacy of text over policy.319
Although the majority discussed the policy considerations animating its interpretation, it made clear that the text alone was
dispositive in finding that the striking nurses had a mandatory
duty to give notice under the plain language of the text.320 It reiterated the policy argument that Congress deliberately created
the notice requirement to be mandatory so as to ensure that a
sudden strike did not impair patient health.321 The Democratic
dissenters, on the other hand, interpreted the Act more loosely,
arguing that “[l]ooking beyond the text [of a statute] for guidance
is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress’ intent.”322 The dissenters thought it “absurd” that Congress “intended to put employees’ jobs in peril simply because their union
was not absolutely punctual.”323 As such, they advanced a rule
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra Part II.C.2.c.
Alexandria Clinic, P.A., 339 N.L.R.B. at 1265.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
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of reason approach to guide interpretation of section 8(g).324
They closed with the notion that “Congress made the policy
choice” in advancing a “rule of reason” and as such the Board is
duty bound to honor that choice.325
Both majority and dissenting opinions also duel over practical considerations. There has been an increase over time in the
use of practical considerations to a statistically significant degree. This may be due in part to the fact that the Board has increasingly viewed cases with a more policy-based focus, and as
such, the dissents tend to use practical reasoning to attack the
policy-based focus of majority opinions. Another reason may be
the personal proclivities of members of the Obama Board, as
Board members Miscimarra and Johnson frequently wrote long
dissents in which they often discussed practical considerations,
as one among many reasons for their dispute with the majority.
III. HOW SHOULD THE BOARD INTERPRET STATUTES?
The results of this analysis provide support to the Llewellyn
view that because canons of interpretation do not constrain voting preferences, Board members may not be basing their decisions on neutral legal principles.326 The fact that Board members
often use the same statutory methodology to advance opposing
outcomes lends support to textualists who bemoan the unpredictability that interpretive canons imply. But the results here
undermine the textualist approach as well; few cases can be resolved on the basis of the statute’s plain meaning, as the act can
be construed broadly or narrowly, producing opposite results.327
This leads to the question: How should the Board (and policyoriented administrative agencies in general) interpret statutes?
Section III.A addresses some of the pitfalls that agencies face in
statutory interpretation. Then, Section III.B analyzes how the
results of this study lend further support to the argument that
agencies should adopt a more empirically-based method of interpretation. In particular, this Section explores how an empirical
approach works in practice at the NLRB, arguing that agencies
should leverage their considerable expertise in interpreting stat-

324. Id. at 1270–71.
325. Id. at 1272.
326. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 959.
327. James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, The National Labor Relations Board in Comparative Context: Introduction,
26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 221, 244 n.10 (2005).
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utes using relevant social science data available to them. Finally, the Article makes the case for why rulemaking may be the
best vehicle for agencies to advance important statutory interpretation so as to best balance the competing objectives of policy
coherence, stability, and democratic accountability.
A. PITFALLS IN CONSTRUING STATUTES LIKE COURTS
The results of this study underscore problems with agency
interpretation of statutes. While scholars have long contended
that agencies should interpret statutes differently than courts
do, in practice, agencies interpret statutes similarly to courts. In
particular, the empirical results of this study point to three potential problems in how the NLRB interprets statutes. First, its
reliance on precedent to justify decisions may simply be a veil to
disguise policymaking. Second, the Board’s overreliance on certain textual canons—in particular the whole text, whole act, and
the whole code rules—may result in decisions that bear little relationship to congressional intent about statutory purpose. Finally, the Board’s selective use of legislative history—especially
when it uses legislative history to limit the text—may result in
decisions that stray from statutory purpose.
1. Use of Precedent to Hide Policymaking
Agencies may rely too much on precedent created by judicial
bodies to assist in interpreting their own governing statutes. In
a large percentage of cases in the dataset, the NLRB interprets
the statute by cobbling together snippets of caselaw in its “quest
for coherence . . . to advance[] a narrative that is . . . part of the
American legal tradition.”328 But using precedent to ground statutory questions of first impression may not be appropriate in the
administrative law context.329 In addition to the fact that there
is rarely one precedent that mandates a given result, law is not
as path dependent in the administrative context.330 Indeed,
Llewellyn noted at least sixty-four ways in which courts can apply prior precedent.331 In particular, agencies’ citation of federal
courts may be especially problematic.332 The NLRB may cite a
328. Krishnakumar, supra note 10, at 1172.
329. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law
Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (2015).
330. Solan, supra note 15, at 1187.
331. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 77–91 (1990).
332. VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 200–02.
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Sixth Circuit case as the basis for its statutory construction, even
though that particular precedent has no bearing on parties outside of the Sixth Circuit, and even though the NLRB has long
maintained a policy of nonacquiescence to appellate decisions.333
Board members should make a distinction between mandatory
and merely persuasive authority when basing decisions on precedent.334
Moreover, there is necessarily a tension between lack of
statutory stare decisis and the benefit that inures when the
meaning of a statute is settled and can be consistently relied
upon.335 Adherence to statutory stare decisis may be especially
important in cases when it is more important that the law be
settled than be settled right. Statutory stare decisis may actually
exist on a continuum. According to this theory, stare decisis is
most important in constitutional cases, where the legislature
lacks an effective means to override a displeasing interpretation,
to a “middle ground” in common law adjudication, to possibly an
even lower level of deference in agency interpretation cases,
where the legislature has numerous means at its disposal to
right a statutory interpretation it finds troubling.336 If statutory
interpretation in administrative adjudications is akin to policymaking, the decision may be best left up to the executive branch,
with the judiciary confined to questioning whether the interpretation is reasonable and supported by evidence.337
2. Overreliance on Textual Rules
In addition, the Board’s overreliance on textual canons like
the whole text, whole act rule, or the whole code rule may be
inappropriate given the realities of statutory drafting. As detailed by the comprehensive study by Gluck and Bressman, false
assumptions about the legislative process abound, especially

333. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 152, at 681.
334. See Solan, supra note 15, at 1175.
335. Id. at 1176. Solan cites Justice Louis Brandeis who advocates statutory
stare decisis. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.” (citation omitted)).
336. See Solan, supra note 15, at 1176.
337. See id. at 777–79.
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with respect to the roles that agencies play in the drafting process.338 In practice, agencies have their own terms of art endowed with specific meaning such that reliance on the whole
code rule to interpret statutes may be misplaced.339 Moreover,
interpretation of like terms in the same statute may not be a
reliable guide to legislative intent. Gluck and Bressman argue
usage may be more consistent across committees overseeing the
drafting as opposed to consistency in the act as a whole.340 As
Gluck argues, “[t]he idea that similar phrases mean the same
thing across an entire statute or that variation of terms is meaningful even across multiple statutes does not comport with the
structural separation of committees and the lack of communication between them, even when they work on the same statute.”341
This empirical study reveals that the Board frequently uses
the whole text, whole act, and whole code rules to interpret the
NLRA. As detailed in Part II, the Board often relies on textual
interpretation and legislative history of other statutory sections
drafted by different Congresses in different time periods to advance a narrative.342 The Board also frequently refers to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of an entirely different statute—
the Railway Labor Act—to interpret section 8(b) cases. Concern
over using the whole text rule may be especially problematic
when the Board uses parts of the law directed at union abuses
to inform meaning about employer abuses. The legislative history of those sections was written at different times in dramatically different political climates, and as such, the Board should
be cautious in extrapolating from one section to another.343 More
attention to the realities of congressional drafting would do
much to improve interpretive assumptions.344 In addition, the
Board often gives too much credit to Congress. In a small, but
substantively significant, number of cases, the Board refers to
congressional inaction or Congress’s inability to clearly state a
338. See Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 801 (showing that Congress often does not abide by assumptions judges make about legislative drafting); Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1028–29 (same); see also Gluck,
supra note 16, at 179 (setting forth ways in which Congress works differently
than assumptions predict).
339. See Shobe, supra note 124, at 518–19.
340. Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 5, at 746–47.
341. Gluck, supra note 16, at 203.
342. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
343. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2020.
344. Cf. Gluck, supra note 16, at 188 (proposing one such approach to accomplishing this objective).
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rule as being important in how it interprets a statute.345 Such
assumptions may be misplaced.
3. Selective Reliance on Legislative History
Finally, the Board’s selective reliance on legislative history—particularly citation of legislative history to limit the clear
language of the text—is misplaced. On the one hand, as Peter
Strauss argues, agencies may be in a better position than courts
to understand and absorb the legislative history.346 This may be
particularly the case for statutes enacted before the professionalization of Congress began in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s.347
Congress did not even have its own internal administrative capacity until the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 and up to that time, House and Senate standing committees had no regular professional staff.348 During the time period
of the NLRA’s drafting, Congressmen and committees were almost completely reliant on the agencies themselves to provide
advice on drafting.349 Indeed, for many statutes enacted during
this period, scholars hypothesize that agencies essentially
“ghost-wrote” the statute and/or its legislative history, even going so far as to draft mock debates to put into the Congressional
Record.350
The Board occasionally uses legislative history to preclude
the Board from updating itself to modern times. For instance,
why should a provision be interpreted with respect to what the
standard was in the construction industry in 1959, a result that
some Board decisions argued was shaped by the legislative history?351 The Board should not use legislative history to wed itself
to employment practices of a bygone era. To do so subverts the
role of the agency as the living, breathing embodiment of statutory interpretation. Further, all legislative history is not the

345. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
346. Strauss, supra note 96, at 321.
347. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–
1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 338 (2013) (noting the dearth of professional staff prior
to this time).
348. Id. In the 1940s, the House and Senate Office of Legislative Counsel
had only five lawyers, a figure seven times less than comparable figures today.
Id. at 339.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 337.
351. See supra Part II.C.3.a.
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same. In a majority of cases, the NLRB relies on legislative history other than the conference committee markup, which often
can be the most “illuminating” part of the legislative history.352
Moreover, while some of the statements cited in the cases in the
dataset were scripted colloquies—which are often seen as important to demonstrate a “shared agreement about statutory
meaning”—most citations were to random statements by a single Congressman in the Congressional Record.353 This lack of reliance on “consensus legislative history” is troubling since it may
not necessarily be indicative of clear congressional intent about
statutory purpose. Moreover, the frequent indirect citations to
legislative history in the cases in the dataset, with the Board
frequently citing to other court decisions that refer to legislative
history, underscores the limited utility legislative history may
have in informing meaning.
Legislative history can be a useful tool in informing purpose,
but the Board at present likely relies too much on legislative history as a shield for disguising policymaking. Instead of looking
at the original enacting Congress’s purpose, the Board should
instead look to the role of the agency in the present world with
legislative history as a starting point to inform understanding.
The Board should rely more heavily on its current dealings with
Congress and the President to inform its vision for contemporary
labor policy. Labor policy need not have a fixed and definite
framework; the nature of a specialized administrative agency is
to change along with the ebb and flow of changing administrations. At the same time, however, the legislative history should
serve as an anchor for the agency to base its understanding of
the text, as the agency is the “guardian or custodian of the legislative scheme as enacted.”354 Instead of relying on “text parsing,
dictionary definitions, and a search for a fixed intent of the enacting Congress,” legislative history should instead be used as
the beginning inflection point to examine “policy and expert considerations, pressures from the current Congress or White
House, and bureaucratic management concerns.”355

352. Gluck, supra note 16, at 207.
353. Id. at 208.
354. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 508; see also
Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at 1066 (“[F ] ederal agencies play a critical
role in the legislative process such that rule drafters have the intimate understanding of legislative history that Strauss hypothesized nearly a quarter century ago.”).
355. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:
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B. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Formulating a normative answer to the question of how
agencies should interpret statutes is a question of how one views
the role of the administrative state. Should agencies be faithful
delegates of the political principals, or should agencies be the
“guardians” of the interpretation of the overarching statute? Or
does the answer lie in some mixture of the two?
A pure textualist reading of the NLRA seems at odds with
the NLRB’s structure and purpose. Nearly seventy-five years following its enactment, it seems doubtful that parties would still
be litigating issues seemingly clearly decided by the statutory
text. If the text itself were the primary criteria for interpreting
the NLRB, what would be the purpose of having a specialized
body? Why not just have the cases heard in the regular district
courts? If the political system is not going to take advantage of
the specialized expertise of the NLRB, it seems superfluous for
the NLRB to interpret statutes in ways that are inconsistent
with its very existence, as Congress wanted to limit the power of
courts to rule in labor disputes.356 Strict adherence to a text constructed by congressional leaders to curb a labor-friendly Board
seventy-five years ago may constrain the Board in how it approaches policymaking and updating labor policy to current economic conditions.357 Moreover, a textualist approach seems at
odds with the Board’s frequent flip-flops on important issues of
policy. If the NLRA actually has a clear and unambiguous meaning, once the five-member Board interprets a term, it would be
unnecessary for the Board to engage in statutory interpretation
of that term again. Frequent flip flops seem only compatible with
a purposivist approach. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that attention to institutional considerations shows why
agencies should be given authority to abandon textualism even
if the courts use it.358 To the extent the Board engages in a textualist approach, it should look to the text to permit a construction, as opposed to a narrowing constraint on policy choices—a
method employed in many of the Board’s textualist decisions.
How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 707 (2007).
356. See Hayes, supra note 131, at 554 (noting that Congress intended to
shift policy-making control in this realm from courts to the Board).
357. See O’Gorman, supra note 59, at 200.
358. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 928; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81,
96 (2017) (noting that the “[r]ules of interpretation must reflect the resources
available to the task”).
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As such, a statutory construction focused on purposivism
with a faithful rendering of the text when clear seems to be the
only method of statutory interpretation consistent with the purposes, aims, and history of the NLRB, and indeed, administrative agencies generally.359 Agencies are in a unique institutional
position to best understand the agency’s purpose, even when the
purpose is conflicting.360 Formed during the New Deal, the
NLRB is charged to be an expert body to fashion labor policy.
Agencies like the NLRB should use that expertise to update their
interpretation of the statute to reflect current realities. With
changing times and shifting economic winds, the Board, advancing a purposivist approach, is best able to effectuate the purposes
and aims of an expert labor body to do what is best for society.361
This Section proposes three recommendations for reform.
First, the Board should use its expertise to buttress its policy
arguments with facts. Rather than merely opine that a given decision will have a certain effect on policy, the Board should use
empirics to competently evaluate the ramifications of its decisions. Second, the Board should make decisions in line with
background principles of substantive law. Third, the time is ripe
to discuss whether the Board should engage more in rulemaking
to guide statutory decisions.
1. Leverage NLRB Expertise Grounded in Real-World
Implications
The Board should use its expertise to craft legal doctrine
that advances the NLRA’s purpose, collecting evidence on policy
and pragmatic consequences of a given decision.362 As Mashaw
argues, “[a]gency control of . . . its interpretive agenda argues for
an interpretive approach that engages in a wider-ranging set of
policy considerations and a more straightforward approach to
political context than would be constitutionally appropriate for
the judiciary.”363 At present, the NLRB chooses between “competing constructions . . . within the range of meanings that the
statutory language can support” when interpreting statutes.364
359. See O’Gorman, supra note 59, at 200 (noting that a purposivist approach affords more flexibility to adapt to current circumstances).
360. See Herz, supra note 12, at 99, 104.
361. See O’Gorman, supra note 59, at 216.
362. See id. at 215–16; Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at
510.
363. Id.
364. Pierce, supra note 1, at 200.
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In essence, the conflict boils down to one side advocating that a
term be construed broadly with the other arguing for a narrow
construction. For instance, in the case of whether graduate student TAs qualify as “employees” under the NLRA, the battle can
be stripped down to whether one thinks that the statutory purpose of the NLRA is best effectuated by a broad or narrow reading of the statute.365 Traditional methods of statutory interpretation relying on the text or legislative history are of little
consequence in answering that question, because the answer
boils down to a political calculation of whether the decisionmaker believes the NLRA should be interpreted broadly to
cover a wider array of workers in disadvantaged positions. This
is more a debate about policy than about textualism.
If the NLRB is truly going to serve its foundational mission,
it needs to start acting more like a policymaking court rather
than a court who does policymaking on the side.366 Board decisions often predict dire consequences of a given decision, yet
never lay out the empirical evidence to back it up. For instance,
in Browning-Ferris Industries, Board members Miscimarra and
Johnson predict that the Board’s revamp of the “joint employer”
test would wreak havoc on the workplace.367 The dissenters
spend page after page bemoaning the negative consequences
that would ensue, without offering any social scientific evidence
to support these claims. Nor does the dissent include any citations to buttress its claims about the decision’s ramifications. In
all, the majority and dissent come down to a policy dispute over
how broadly to interpret the word “employee.” This same pattern—of both the majority and dissent making arguments without empirical evidence regarding the likely consequences of a
given decision—is prevalent throughout the statutory interpretation cases studied.

365. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
366. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2057 (“[T]he Board continues to
operate like a court, limiting itself to the specific issues brought to it by the
General Counsel, failing to bring multiple areas of Board doctrine together to
enrich its understanding and amplify its remedial capacities, and, most of all,
using rights rhetoric as a way to mask what would otherwise be its obligation
to seek out (let alone generate) empirical assessments of the effects of its policies.”).
367. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at *26 (Aug.
27, 2015). The dissenters continue: “We believe the majority’s test will actually
foster substantial bargaining instability by requiring the nonconsensual presence of too many entities with diverse and conflicting interests on the ‘employer’
side.” Id. at *23.
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The NLRB can be reformed to give it more power to engage
in policymaking in a more explicit and fairer way. For instance,
if the NLRB were to truly embrace its policymaking role, it
would ask parties that appear before it to brief the economic effects that would flow from its decision. Rather than vague assertions of “policy” or pontifications about a given case’s possible
ramifications, the Board should consider expert opinions so as to
have a solid foundation to inform policymaking to serve the aims
of (1) avoiding strikes; and (2) increasing wages, the twin aims
that Congress states as the underlying purpose of the NLRA.
New Dealers envisioned agencies as expert, professional
bodies capable of analyzing social and economic problems and
relying on scientific and empirical information that courts and
legislatures lack capacity to fully consider.368 The Board never
developed the kind of non-legal expertise that administrative
agencies were supposed to have due to historical circumstances.369 In the 1940s, widespread opposition to the Board resulted in Congress gutting the Board’s Division of Economic Research, which had gotten a reputation as being biased towards
labor interests.370 Further, an early turf war with the Department of Labor (DOL) resulted in the Board not having access to
DOL’s empirical research on labor.371 DOL has the ability to produce “high-quality empirical analyses of the myriad questions
that arise in NLRB cases,”372 yet currently the Board has no access to this valuable information. Moreover, the Board is not able
to coordinate data gathering and policy analysis with DOL, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or state labor
agencies.373 Giving NLRB back its policy tools would do much to
make its statutory interpretation more reasoned and more consistent.
368. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 38–39 (1938).
369. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2015. The NLRB states that
“[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic
analysis.” 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (added by Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947));GROSS, REMAKING, supra note 135, at 225 (recounting the history of Taft-Hartley).
370. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2048. In the 1940s, Congress
held hearings about the NLRB, concerned that the Board was ruling too much
in a pro-labor direction. Id.
371. Id. at 2049. Labor Secretary Francis Perkins campaigned for the NLRB
to be a part of the Department of Labor instead of an independent agency. Id.
at 2045.
372. Id. at 2051.
373. Id. at 2049.
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Of course, critics of this approach may argue that social science data may itself be tinged with political calculations. Each
side could surely hire experts to advance their preferred policy
position. However, by creating a nonpartisan body within the
NLRB akin to the Congressional Budget Office to offer economic
advice on the ramifications of a given decision would do much to
leverage the agency’s expertise, yielding more stable and consistent decisions.
At present, the NLRB changes its interpretation too frequently with changing political realities. Since 2000, the NLRB
has changed its position on whether graduate TA constitute “employees” under the NLRA three times.374 While such a change
may on occasion be preferential or mandated from a democratic
accountability perspective, too much change—especially when
such change is not grounded in sound social science data—results in a lack of stability in labor laws. Mandating some empirical evidence to back up claims about policy increases the transaction cost for policy change, making it less likely that agencies
make frivolous or unsubstantiated policy changes. But requiring
changes in interpretation to at least be minimally grounded in
evidence that the decision accomplishes the statute’s purpose
would do much to ensure that decisions affecting the everyday
lives of millions of people are grounded in something more than
the ideological preferences of a given presidentially-appointed
Board member. Such a requirement would prevent the executive
from gaining too much power at the expense of the other
branches. In essence, reforming the process to include more
voices would be a better alternative than the present system to
best balance the goals of policy coherence, stability and democratic accountability.
2. Ground Statutory Interpretation in Substantive
Background Principles
As part of using its expertise to interpret statutes, agencies
should interpret statutes in a way that makes sense in light of
background principles of substantive law.375 As Jonathan Siegal
argues, “this distinctive degree of knowledge puts agencies in a
particularly good position to utilize an interpretive method,” giving weight to “background principles” to guide interpretation.376
374. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
375. See Siegel, supra note 23, at 124 (arguing that agency expertise should
lead to reliance on substantive law in statutory interpretation).
376. Id.
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These substantive principles may tilt the result toward a given
result, in line with how the law is usually interpreted in similar
cases.377 For instance, in an environmental law case, in interpreting whether a substance is “hazardous,” the EPA may give
particular weight to the concentration of the chemical, because
of the background principle that concentration is an important
consideration in determining whether something is hazardous,
even if the statutory text is unclear or ambiguous on the topic.378
These “field-specific canons of construction” are based on scientific study379 and their usage would ensure that statutes within
substantive areas are interpreted consistently and in line with
the expertise of the agency.
The NLRB is uniquely positioned to understand the nuances
of workplace discrimination and harassment. For instance, in interpreting whether conduct is “protected” under the statute or
whether the employer or union acts in a “concerted” fashion, the
NLRB can apply background norms of labor laws to elucidate
understanding of those terms.380 The experience of hearing and
ruling on thousands of cases gives the NLRB the unique perspective to understand when employer or union conduct directed at
employees is truly egregious enough to warrant reprimand under the NLRA.381
3. Use Rulemaking as a Tool to Advance Key Statutory
Interpretations
Finally, the Board should change its method of policymaking and rely more on rulemaking or guidance documents to advance statutory directives.382 The Board needs to engage in policymaking, and one questions whether an institutional body
377. See id. (suggesting that agency interpretation by this method will make
sense in the broader field of relevant law).
378. Cf. id. at 125–28 (explaining the concept of using background legal principles as a tool of statutory interpretation). Siegal cites the case of National Resources Defense Council v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 907
F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990), as an example. Id. at 132–35.
379. Id. at 135.
380. Cf. id. at 136 (arguing that the EPA is in the best position to apply
principles of environmental law).
381. See generally, supra Part II (analyzing the NLRB’s extensive body of
adjudications).
382. See, e.g., R. Alexander Acosta, Rebuilding the Board: An Argument for
Structural Change, Over Policy Prescription, at the NLRB, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L.
REV. 347, 359 (2010) (arguing that rulemaking “will help stabilize Board law
and restore public and judicial confidence in the agency”); Charlotte Garden,
Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64
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acting like a court can ever really be a reliable policymaking
body.383 Scholars argue that an agency’s statutory interpretation
is probably not invariant to forum.384 An agency’s ability to incorporate political preferences and budgetary concerns into decisions may be improved in rulemaking as opposed to adjudication.385 The Board’s adjudicatory decisions are so intermixed
with policymaking that it is almost impossible for the Board to
have any precedent on which to rely, resulting in confusion before the appellate courts, who frequently cite to NLRB caselaw
only to find that the NLRB changed its position.386
The Board could set up a clearer boundary between policymaking and adjudicatory decisions if it relied more on rulemaking or guidance documents to set forth its policy-fused statutory
interpretations. For instance, instead of relying on adjudication
to define “employee,” the Board could engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to set forth clear standards regarding who falls
within the coverage of the Act.387 In so doing, the Board should
adopt “evolving, iterative, [and] practical application[]” to “effectuate a statutory program”388 by looking at inputs such as:
technical assessment of on-the-ground facts; expert predictions; the
policy views of administrators and staff; input from the public, especially from affected interests; political influence and control from the
White House and the current Congress; the agency’s own understanding of the statutory provisions in its organic act; and the practical needs
of the bureaucracy to manage and enforce a statutory program.389
EMORY L.J. 1469, 1473–77 (2015) (arguing for increased reliance on rulemaking
to improve the NLRB’s stability, consistency, and lawmaking). There are of
course disadvantages to rulemaking as well, as it involves more time and cost
and offers less flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the near term.
See Acosta, supra, at 357–58 (acknowledging cost and difficulty that the NLRB
could initially face in a transition to rulemaking).
383. See Strauss, supra note 96, at 329 (observing that “agency officials are
concededly political” and therefore differ from judges in important respects).
384. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 4, at 522; see also Kevin
M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 225, 226 (2009) (“[A]n agency’s approach to statutory interpretation
is in part a function of the policymaking from through which it acts.”).
385. Stack, supra note 384, at 238.
386. For instance, the Board so frequently changes who qualifies as an “employee” under the NLRA that no doubt the appellate courts find it difficult to
keep up. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
387. See Acosta, supra note 382, at 359 (arguing that rulemaking would
more “clearly delineate” the NLRB’s scope of authority). But see Tuck, supra
note 150, at 1121 (proposing that a policy statement on the definition of “employee” is a more feasible alternative to rulemaking).
388. Foote, supra note 355, at 681.
389. Id.
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Using rulemaking would also bring the NLRB in line with how
most other administrative agencies conduct their business,390
and offer a chance to use its expertise to collect and analyze information to foster best practices.391 Appellate courts may be
more likely to defer to the rulemaking process because rulemaking by necessity is more inclusive.392 Engaging in statutory interpretation through rulemaking might also lead to greater national uniformity393 and might provide more notice to litigants of
legal rules, ensuring better compliance.394 Moreover, rulemaking
would help Congress better monitor agencies since it would be
easier to raise the “fire alarm” when an agency departs from political preferences.395 Of course, engaging in rulemaking to interpret statutes may alter the way an agency reviews statutes,
given that agencies may interpret a statute more aggressively if
it feels confident that the appellate court will apply Chevron deference.396 But engaging in rulemaking may reduce the propensity of the Board to act like judges “balancing rights rather than
[like] policy analysts studying social and economic regulatory
problems.”397 This greater degree of certainty may give both litigants and agencies more comfort.398

390. Acosta, supra note 382, at 352.
391. See supra Part III.B (proposing reforms to leverage NLRB expertise).
392. Garden, supra note 382, at 1475.
393. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1112 (1987) (noting the value of national uniformity in agency statutory interpretation).
394. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure
and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 480–81 (2003) (outlining
advantages of rulemaking over adjudication, including clarity and compliance).
395. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2044 (2011).
396. Barnett & Walker, supra note 60, at 43 (finding that agencies interpreting statutes through adjudication win more than agencies interpreting statutes
through rulemaking under Chevron); Walker, Inside Agency, supra note 5, at
1063 (noting study found that 40% of agency rule drafters thought that the
agency would be “more aggressive” in interpreting a statute if they felt Chevron
applies).
397. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 20, at 2019.
398. Barnett & Walker, supra note 60, at 72 (noting that giving more guidance to courts in interpreting statutes would be a “comforting swaddling blanket
rather than handcuffs”).
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CONCLUSION
Formed during the New Deal, the NLRB of 2019 is at its
heart a policymaking body behaving like a court. There are several problems with this approach. The Board’s unique institutional position in the separation of powers system requires it to
interpret statutes differently than a court might, taking into consideration the consequences of policy as opposed to simply engaging in a text-based analysis of the statute backed up by legislative history. The Board should adapt its techniques of
statutory interpretation to fully embrace its role as a policymaking body to better guide judicial review. It can do this by making
its policymaking more explicit and grounding its decisions in social science data and substantive labor law principles. It can also
use the rulemaking process to make its statutory interpretation
more transparent. Doing so would allow agencies to better balance the aims of achieving stability, coherence, and democratic
accountability in statutory interpretation.

